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ESSAYS ON CONSUMPTION CHOICE 
XIAOJIA ZHANG 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 
Major Professor: Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Professor of Economics 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The dissertation consists of three essays that study consumption choices and their 
policy implications. The first chapter tests the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis via 
an experimental approach. University students are asked to provide their consumption 
choices in hypothetical circumstances. Background information such as their numerical 
and financial literacy are collected in the experiment. The data suggest that the subjects’ 
consumption choices do not necessarily support the life-cycle permanent income 
hypothesis. The consumption levels chosen by some subjects vary greatly when they face 
the same total remaining lifetime resources, but different composition of these resources 
between net and human wealth. This consumption error varies across gender and is 
affected by the subjects’ numerical and financial ability. The results have important 
implications for policymakers. 
 In the second chapter a censored quadratic model is used to examine whether soda 
taxes affect consumption. Households that do and do not consume soda are taken into 
account. The results show that in states that have a higher soda than food tax or that have 
just increased the soda tax rates, households consume significantly less soda. Households 
that have more children and are located in areas with a small population assign 
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significantly larger weight to soda in their total utility. The price elasticity of soda 
consumption is high. The unconditional price elasticity is larger than the conditional price 
elasticity, which is measured using households that do purchase soda. Also, the price 
elasticity for low-income households is greater than for high-income households. The 
results presented may be important to policymakers setting soda taxes to prevent obesity. 
 Following the second chapter, a modified three-good censored utility model is 
used to examine if beer and wine taxes affect alcohol consumption. This study provides 
empirical estimates of price elasticities on beer and wine, which suggests that beer taxes 
may not be a good avenue for policymakers to consider in counteracting the serious 
consequence of alcohol abuse.  However, wine taxes may be effective in reducing alcohol 
abuse, especially for low-income households. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Testing Consumption Choice: Through an Experimental Approach 
1.1 Introduction 
Questions such as how much people consume over their lifetime with permanent life 
income have puzzled economists for many decades. According to the Life Cycle-
Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCPIH) theory (Friedman, 1957), consumers can 
correctly estimate their ability to consume over their lifetime, and then set current 
consumption to the appropriate fraction according to the estimate. Theoretically, the life 
cycle-permanent income hypothesis is widely accepted. But does this theory really work 
in the real life?  The earliest literature of using an experimental test on consumption behavior was 
by Johnson, et al. (1987). They carried out an experiment among 49 undergraduate and 
MBA students at Boston University. The researchers asked their subjects to make 
consumption decisions year by year over their life cycle. They also asked their subjects to 
make single-year consumption choices under different economic conditions (earnings, 
asset levels and interest rates). By estimating the standard life cycle model using the 
responses, the authors found that many subjects made substantial errors repeatedly. 
Subjects chose different consumption levels in identical economic situations, and 
oversaved by sizable amounts. Hence, the standard life cycle model could only explain 
less than half of the variance in consumption. The results from the experiment also 
significantly rejected the hypotheses that intertemporal consumption preferences could be 
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either homothetic or uniform across subjects. The models used in this paper largely 
follow their study, while the design of questionnaire includes significant modification.  Similarly, some other economists have found that people hardly maximize the 
present value of the payments they can receive. Using a survey method, Loewenstein and 
Sicherman (1991) found that while people were facing different profiles of payments, 
only a minority of them made choices based on present-value maximization. For wage 
payments, only 7.3 percent of the subjects based their choice entirely on present-value 
maximization. For rental income, 23.1 percent of the subjects made their choice 
following present-value maximization. They also showed that subjects answering 
questionnaires related to wages were willing to sacrifice an average of $2,352 to attain 
their preferred payment option. Consistent with Johnson, et al. (1987), Loewenstein and 
Sicherman's (1991) study challenges the assumption of the rational choice that people 
should maximize their profit given certain profiles of payments.   The above studies mainly focus on people’s decision-making. Numerical and 
financial ability are hardly taken into consideration. Several recent studies, however, 
suggest differences in people’s numerical and financial literacy could be the reason why 
the standard life-cycle model typically fails to explain the variance in consumption. For 
instance, Banks and Oldfield (2007) showed that the correlations between numerical 
ability and pension arrangements are severe and persistent. Banks, et al. (2010) found out 
that in the years leading up to retirement, the more numerate ones accumulate financial 
assets faster than those who are less numerate, and that they decumulate it faster after 
retirement. They also discovered that those with lower numeracy have different wealth 
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trajectories both pre- and post-retirement than their more numerate counterparts, while 
the distributions of retirement expectations and net replacement rates in different 
numeracy groups are similar. Smith, et al. (2010) showed that cognitive ability such as 
numeracy is a crucial component of that decision, with larger effects of numeracy for 
husbands than for wives. Most of these studies, however, used English Longitudinal 
Study of Ageing (ELSA) data, which is a large sample of those aged 50 or over. Taking 
into consideration that those over 50 years of age are very likely to have weaker 
numerical and financial knowledge than current university students, the study in this 
chapter uses an alternative approach of testing the current university students whose 
average age is 24.5.  Following the work of Johnson, et al. (1987), the model in this paper is the 
standard life-cycle model (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Ando and Modigliani 1963). 
According to the model, if the consumption decisions are made without error, then 
individual should make their yearly consumption decisions according to the present value 
of all resources. The following hypotheses, the first two of which were also tested in the 
paper by Johnson, et al. (1987), are implied if people optimize their consumption 
following the life-cycle model: 
Hypothesis I. Subjects’ consumption choice directly depends on the present value of 
assets and annual income and is independent of how they are mixed. 
Hypothesis II. Subjects should exhaust their resources when their life ends. 
Hypothesis III. Subjects will correctly predict the remaining assets at the beginning 
of their retirement. 
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 Hypothesis IV. Subjects smooth their consumption path by evenly arranging their 
annual consumption depending upon their assets.   To test these hypotheses, and to find out whether people’s consumption is related 
to some of their characteristics, including gender, numerical ability, and financial literacy, 
I conducted an experiment among 108 students at Boston University. The students were 
asked to provide their consumption choice in a given circumstance. They were also 
provided questions to test their numerical ability and financial literacy. This study is 
different from the previous study in several aspects. One of the major limitations of an 
economic experiment, as pointed out by Ballinger, et al. (2003), is that samples are 
unrepresentative and small. For many reasons, an economic experiment typically  
involves no more  than 50 participants. In this study, however, 108 subjects are included. 
The comparatively large sample can help me to avoid the inconsistency and bias that a 
small sample experiment may bring.  
 The subjects who participated in most economic experiments are typically from a 
single department or class, such as psychology or economics, so these subjects are very 
unrepresentative, and their behavior might be affected by their majors or by what they 
have been taught in their classes. This can lead to biased analyses. For instance, Ballinger, 
et al. (2003) carried out experiments only among students  from  social-science classes at 
the University of Houston, whose behavior might be greatly affected by what have been 
taught in these classes. In this paper, subjects are undergraduate and graduate students 
from various majors (detailed discussions followed in Section 1.3). 
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 The questionnaire in this paper is simpler than a majority of previous experiments 
in this field. The simplicity of the questionnaire enables subjects to take the questions 
more carefully and raises the probability that they will finish all the questions. 
 While most other studies have used only one approach to test subjects’ numerical 
ability, three approaches are used in my study: some numerical tests; subjects’ evaluation 
of their own math ability; and subjects’ SAT, ACT or GRE test scores in each field. By 
doing so, we can derive a complete figure of subjects’ numerical ability, since a single 
approach for evaluation (most often the numerical ability tests provided in the experiment) 
may not perfectly reflect subjects’ numerical ability and hence may not give us reliable 
results, as those with high math ability might make mistakes in one small test due to 
many reasons.  
1.2 Experiment Design 
In the experiment part, all the subjects are put into a circumstance where they have just 
turned 40 years old, will never marry, and will die for sure the day they turn 100. Their 
economic world entails no uncertainty. There is no inflation, no changes in any prices of 
any goods, no medical expenses, no taxes, no government pensions or other benefits, no 
housing expenses, and no emergency expenditure. They face a fixed 3 percent interest 
rate, and they want to spend all the money before they die.  
 The subjects are provided with four different sets of assets and labor earning 
combinations. In Case 1, the current assets are assumed to be $645,797, and the subjects 
can earn $77,769 from working each year through age 65, when they retire. In Case 2, the 
current assets are assumed to be $1,147,711, and the subjects can earn $106,373 per year. 
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In Case 3, the assets and earning combination is $191,331 (assets) and $103,868 
(earning). In Case 4, the combination is $754,801 (assets) and $128,937 (earning). In 
short, the present value of earnings and assets combination in Case 1 and Case 3 adds up 
to an identical amount ($2,000,000 USD), while the present value of earnings and assets 
combination in Case 2 and Case 4 adds up to another identical amount ($3,000,000 USD). 
The subjects are asked to provide the amount they choose to spend for this year, when 
they are 60 and 80 years old, respectively, as well as the amount they choose to spend 
each year, assuming that they want to spend exactly the same amount each year through 
age 100. Subjects are asked to write down the amount of how much assets they expect to 
have at age 65. All the subjects are asked to provide their best intuitive answers, and they 
are not allowed to use a calculator or make the calculation on paper.  
 The subjects are also asked to provide some basic information including gender, 
year of birth, country of origin, education level, parents’ education level, ethnic 
background, math skills, SAT, ACT or GRE scores, etc.  
 Three numerical questions are provided to test the subjects’ math ability. Three 
additional questions are also asked to assess subjects’ financial literacy, such as whether 
they understand present value, whether they know how to calculate the present value of a 
cash flow, and whether they are familiar with compounding returns. 
1.3 Data 
The subjects are 108 students from Boston University. Each subject is given free lunch or 
dinner as a reward. Among the subjects, 59 are undergraduate students, while 49 are 
graduate students. 39 are females, while 69 are males. Their majors include medicine, 
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biology, neuroscience, business, electrical engineering, health, mathematics, economics, 
divinity, law, computer science, history, physical therapy, biomedical engineering, 
mechanical engineering, English, journalism, international relations, philosophy, 
education, liberal arts, communications, physiology, film/TV, marine science, social 
work, political science, psychology, music, hospitality, statistics, and physics. Their 
countries of origin include the USA, China, India, UK, Panama, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Mexico, Canada, Russia, France, Costa Rica and Ukraine. 34 of them are not US 
citizens. 51 are white, 5 are black, 9 Hispanic, 40 Asian, and 3 mixed background. Their 
ages vary from 17 to 58, and the average age is 24.5. 18 are from wealthy families, 72 
consider their families neither rich nor poor, and 18 are from poor or very poor families.  
1.4 Model 
The basic model I use in this paper is the standard life-cycle model (Modigliani and 
Brumberg 1954; Ando and Modigliani 1963).  
Max    U=U (C1,…Cd)                                               
s.t.  ∑ Cj( 11+r)j−1 =  A1(1 + r) + H1dj=1  
Where Cj is the consumption at age j (in this experiment it is assumed to be constant 
with time). d is the period in which the person lives. r is the interest rate, which in my 
experiment is assumed to be constant. A1 is the value of the initial asset. H1 is the present 
value of labor earnings.  
According to the model, if the consumption and saving decisions are made without 
error, then individuals should make their yearly saving/consumption decisions according 
to their prediction. It can easily be seen from the above optimization problem that for any 
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given value of the sum of assets and present value of earnings (the right hand side 
equation), the solution for C should be the same. 
In Johnson, et al. (1987), the authors analyzed the correlation between total resources 
and subjects’ consumption level by using the following three models: 
C=aR+u (1) 
C=a+bR+u (2) 
C=a+bA+cE+u (3) 
Where C is the pooled consumption for the evenly spent case, A is the present value 
of the asset, and E is the present value of the total labor earning, R is the present value of 
total resources. According to Johnson, et al. (1987), a way to evaluate the performance of 
the standard life-cycle model is in terms of the R-bar square of Model 1. If the model is 
correct, the R-bar square should be (approaching) unity. If people equally value a dollar 
in labor earning as in asset, then the coefficients b and c in Model 3 should be identical. 
In the following models subjects’ consumption errors are used as dependent variables. 
If people’s consumption follows the standard life cycle model, they should make the 
same consumption choice when facing the same present value of resources and the same 
interest rate (Johnson, et al., 1987). That is, they should make the same consumption 
choices in Case 1 and Case 3 (the present value of resources in these two questions are 
both $2,000,000 USD), as well as in Case 2 and Case 4 (the present value of resources in 
these two questions are both $3,000,000 USD). Consumption errors in Case 1 versus 3, 
for example, is defined as (Consumption  in  Case  3)−(Consumption  in  Case  1)Consumption  in  Case  1 . Then two models 
related to resource can be written as follows.   
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CE=aR+u (4) 
CE=a+bR+u (5) 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Consumption Errors Made By Subjects 
Using the data derived from the experiment, we can test Hypothesis I, which is: 
Subjects’ consumption choice directly depends on the present value of assets and annual 
income and is independent of how they are mixed. 
(Table 1.1) 
Table 1.1 lists the consumption errors for the subjects. From Table 1.1 we can see 
that the average consumption error for Case 2 versus Case 4 (the high resource case) is 
much smaller than the consumption error for Case 1 versus Case 3. 
(Table 1.2) 
Table 1.2 lists the distribution of subjects by their absolute consumption errors. 
Consumption errors are more widely spread across subjects in Case 1 versus Case 3 
(where the resources are lower) than in Case 2 versus Case 4. We can see from the table 
that a large fraction of subjects make sizable mistakes, especially in Case 1 versus Case 3. 
(Table 1.3) 
(Table 1.4) 
It can be seen from the Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 that, although a large fraction of 
subjects make zero consumption errors (18.5% and 20.4%, respectively), there are also a 
large fraction of subjects who make sizable mistakes, especially in Cases 1 and 3. In 
Cases 1 and 3, 12.0% of the total subjects make errors of over 100%, and 16.7% of the 
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total subjects make errors over 50% (either larger than 50% or smaller than -50%, 
excluding those beyond ±100%). In Cases 2 and 4, 2.8% of the total subjects make errors 
over 100% (either larger than 100% or smaller than -100%), 22.2% of the total subjects 
make errors over 50%  (either larger than 50% or smaller than -50%, excluding those 
beyond ±100%). 
Figure 1.1 shows subjects’ consumption choices in each case combination for this 
year and the evenly spent case. 
(Figure 1.1) 
Further conclusion can be drawn from Figure 1.1. If subjects choose their 
consumption based entirely on the total resource, and if they can estimate it perfectly, 
then the spots should be around the 45-degree line. However, it can be seen that although 
most spots are around the 45-degree line, some are far from it. 
Since the total amount of resources in Case 1 and Case 3 are both $2,000,000 USD, 
and since the total amount of resources in Case 2 and Case 4 are both $3,000,000 USD, if 
people can estimate the total resource correctly, and if they are homothetic about their 
consumption, the consumption in an even number case should be 50% larger than the 
consumption in an odd number case. Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 list the fraction of subjects 
by consumption difference between each even case and odd case, which is defined as 
(Consumption  in  the  second  case )−(Consumption  in  the  first  case )Consumption  in  the  first  case .  
(Table 1.5) 
(Table 1.6) 
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From Table 1.5 and Table 1.6, we can see that a large fraction of subjects consume 
exactly 50% more in the even case than in the odd case, but an even larger fraction of 
subjects make the difference far larger than 50%. In both the “this year” case and the 
“evenly spent” case, around 20% of subjects make the difference over 100%. 
Similar conclusion can be drawn from Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3: if people’s 
consumption choices follow the LCPIH, then their consumption combination should fall 
on the two-thirds line, since the total resource of the odd number case is two-thirds of that 
of the even number case. However, not all the spots are around the two-thirds line; some 
are far from it. But most spots are below the 45-degree line, which is consistent with our 
prediction, since the total resources in the even numbered cases is larger than that in the 
odd numbered cases.  
(Figure 1.2) 
(Figure 1.3) 
1.5.2 Do People Oversave? 
Hypothesis II tells us that if people’s consumption choice follows the LCPIH theory, they 
will exhaust their lifetime consumption; that is, they will choose to spend all their 
resources at the end of their lives. The consumption that could exhaust Cases 1 and 3 
resources is $72,265.9 USD, and the consumption that could exhaust Cases 2 and 4 
resources is $108,398.9 USD.  
(Table 1.7) 
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From Table 1.7 we can see that an overwhelming majority of subjects oversave, 
which is similar to the finding of Johnson, et al. (1987). We can also see that more people 
oversave in Cases 2 and 4 (where the resources are higher) than in Cases 1 and 3. 
1.5.3 Can People Make Correct Expectations? 
According to Hypothesis III, subjects will correctly predict the assets left at the beginning 
of their retirement. 
(Table 1.8) 
 Table 1.8 shows the median of the following two ratio: the first ratio is between 
the expected age 65 asset the subject provided and the actual assets that subject would 
have at age 65, given his/her answer to the smoothing consumption question; the second 
ratio is between the subject's expected age 65 asset and age 65 assets if the person 
chooses to spend the same amount each year, and he/she can exactly exhausts his/her 
assets at age 65. Here, I use the median rather than the average because some subjects 
exhaust all their assets by age 65. Therefore, their age 65 assets should be negative. If 
they expected to have a positive number of their age 65 assets (which everyone does), 
they actually overestimate their assets, but the average ratio is made to be lower (which 
seems that they underestimate the age 65 assets), since their ratio is negative. This will 
cause a bias if we use the average ratio as the measurement.  
 If people can correctly estimate the assets they have at age 65 according to the 
consumption they provided, the first ratio in Table 1.8 should approach 1. It can be seen 
from Table 1.8 that subjects generally underestimate the asset they could have at age 65, 
given the consumption level in the smoothing question they provided.  
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 So are people’s expected assets based on their goal of exhausting all resources? 
The answer is no according to Table 1.8. If they can correctly calculate the assets they 
should have at age 65, and make their expectation of age 65 based on that, then the 
numbers in the second row in Table 1.8 should be 1. However, from the table we can see 
that the ratio is smaller than 1. That is, people generally expect that they have fewer 
assets than the assets they should have at age 65 if they correctly arrange their 
consumption each year and exhaust all their resources at their death.  
 Based on the information from Table 1.8, we may conclude that people generally 
underestimate their age 65 assets, either based on the consumption provided in the 
smoothing question, or on the goal of exhausting all assets. 
(Table 1.9) 
 From Table 1.9 we can see that for Case 1 and 2, the average annual consumption 
exceeds annual consumption that exhausts resources, while the opposite is true for Cases 
3 and 4. 
1.5.4 Do People Smooth Their Consumption in Respect to Age? 
According to Hypothesis IV, subjects smooth their consumption path by evenly arranging 
their annual consumption given a certain amount of assets.  
 In the first part of the survey, subjects were asked to provide the consumption 
level they chose for this year (when they are 40), when they are 60, and when they are 80. 
Table 1.10 shows the fraction of subjects whose age 60 (80) consumptions are greater, 
equal, or smaller than their age 40 (60) consumptions. From the table we can see that 
over 50% of subjects do not choose exactly the same consumption level at different ages. 
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(Table 1.10) 
1.5.5 Test of the Models in Johnson, et al. (1987) Paper 
(Table 1.11) 
According to Johnson, et al. (1987), a way to evaluate the performance of the standard 
life-cycle model is in terms of R-bar square of Model 1. If the model is correct, the R-bar 
square should approach unity. But it can be seen from Table 1.11 that the R-bar square in 
Model 1 is far from unity. Moreover, the Model 2 intercept is very large. This rejects the 
homotheticity hypothesis, and is consistent with the results of Johnson, et al. (1987).  
The significance value of the F test of Model 2 versus Model 3 is 0.0007. This 
indicates that we can reject b=c=0 in Model 3 at a 5% significance level. The result 
implies that subjects do not equally value a dollar in human wealth and a dollar in asset. 
This is consistent with the findings of Johnson, et al. (1987) of pooled age 35 data. In 
their study, Johnson, et al. (1987) found that the asset coefficient is greater than the 
earning coefficient, which is consistent with my result. 
(Figure 1.4) 
According to Model 2, C=a+bR+u. The a and b in Figure 1.4 are derived from 
regression of this year consumption to R in respect to every subject. So there are 108 of 
each in total. From Figure 1.4 we can see that most of the constants in Model 2 are 
around zero, but some of the constants are far from zero.  
So what affects the constant and coefficient of R in Model 2? Is there any 
characteristic, such as gender, or wealth, making the constant significant? The effect of 
characteristics will be discussed in the next section, but according to the regression of a 
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and b to subjects’ characteristics, it shows that none of the factors is significant to a and b 
at a 5% significance level. Hence, none of exogenous characteristics significantly affects 
whether the constant should be zero. 
According to Model 3, C=a+bA+cE+u, if people equally value one dollar in assets as 
in labor earning, then the coefficients b and c should be equal. However, we can see from 
Figure 1.5 that a large fraction of data points are not around the 45-degree line. This 
graph is also derived from regression of this year’s consumption to asset and earning set 
for each subject. It can also be seen that most data points are above the 45-degree line. 
Thus the asset coefficients are larger than the earning coefficients in most cases. This is 
consistent with the age 35 data of Johnson, et al. (1987).  
(Figure 1.5) 
By regressing b and c to individuals’ demographic characteristics, the only 
characteristic that plays a significant role in determining b and c is education level. Hence, 
education plays a significant role in determining b and c in Model 3. 
If we use consumption errors as the dependent variable, the results are as listed in 
Table 1.12: 
(Table 1.12) 
It can be seen from the small coefficient of R that, although we can conclude from 
Section 1.5.1 that high resource leads to small consumption errors, the effect of resources 
in determining subjects’ consumption error is small. 
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1.5.6 Do Certain Characteristics Affect Subjects’ Consumption Errors? 
Does any of the demographic characteristics affect subjects’ ability to make correct 
decisions? If we put all characteristics as independent variables and have absolute 
consumption error as a dependent variable, we can estimate the following multivariate 
regression function: 
�CE 1iCE 2i� = �β1β2�Xi + �u1iu2i� (6) 
CE1i is the absolute consumption error in Case 1 versus Case 3 made by Subject i, 
CE2i is the absolute consumption error in Case 2 versus Case 4 made by Subject i. Xi is an 
i× 1 vector of characteristic variables, including gender (a dummy equals 1 if female), 
age, the years of education the subject has received; a dummy variable equals 1 if the 
subject is a non-US citizen; a dummy variable equals 1 if the subject is risk neutral; a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the subject is Asian; a dummy variable equals 1 if the subject 
is black, Hispanic or other race; a dummy variable equals 1 if saving or financial issues 
are often talked about by the subject's parent(s); a dummy variable equals 1 if the 
subject's father or mother is a good saver; the subject's parents' education levels; a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the subject evaluates him/herself strong or very strong at 
math, and the correct scores the subject get in the math or financial literacy tests in this 
experiment. The results of the multivariate regression are listed in Table 1.13: 
(Table 1.13) 
From Table 1.13 we can see that people’s consumption errors in the smaller resource 
case are significantly smaller if their parent(s) are good savers. Additionally, Asian 
students' consumption errors are significantly larger in the high resource case.  
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1.5.7 Do Men Make Smaller Consumption Errors Than Women? 
(Table 1.14) 
(Table 1.15) 
From Table 1.14 we can see that the average and absolute average consumption error for 
males are generally smaller than for females. Table 1.15 lists the percentage of subjects in 
each gender by the size of absolute consumption errors. It could be seen that the 
percentage of female subjects who make large mistakes is larger than males in every case. 
However, the maximum consumption errors for men are much larger than that for women 
in both cases.  
(Table 1.16) 
For both men and women, an overwhelming majority of subjects oversave. This is 
the same result as derived by Johnson, et al. (1987). In all but Case 4, more men than 
women oversave.  
(Table 1.17) 
If people can correctly estimate the assets they have at age 65 according to the 
consumption they provided, the numbers in the first row Table 1.17 should approach 1. 
Men are just as likely to underestimate their assets by age 65 as women. 
(Table 1.18) 
If people spend exactly the same amount that could exhaust their total resources, then 
the number in Table 1.18 should be 1. Women’s ratios more closely approach 1. 
Therefore, considering the results from Table 1.17, women are more likely to exhaust 
their total resources. 
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Test of three Models (1), (2), and (3): 
For males: 
(Table 1.19) 
For females: 
(Table 1.20) 
The coefficients of A and E in Model 3 should be identical if the irrelevance of the 
mix of resources exists. Women’s coefficients of these two variables are closer to each 
other than men’s. For both men and women, the constants in Model (2) are far from zero. 
Hence consumption does not totally depend on resources.  
By consumption error, the results are listed in Table 1.21. 
(Table 1.21) 
Again resources play a very small role in determining subjects’ consumption errors.  
1.5.8. Do People with Higher Numerical Ability Make Smaller Consumption Errors?  
The numerical ability is tested in my study using three approaches: numbers of subjects’ 
correct answers in three numerical tests, subjects’ own reported math ability (very strong, 
strong, average, weak, very weak), and subjects’ math scores in SAT, ACT or GRE tests. 
All three approaches are considered while measuring the relation between subjects’ 
consumption errors and numerical ability. 
1.5.8.1 By Correct Answers in the Numerical Test 
All the subjects are asked to answer three numerical questions: 1)“Suppose you have 
$300 in your account. The account earns 10% interest per year. How much will you have 
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in your account at the end of the third year?” 2) “You have two options: A) get $120 at 
the end of this year for sure, or B) get $115 now. There is no inflation and the interest 
rate is 3%. Which option would you prefer?” 3) “Suppose you invest x dollars for one 
year with 5% interest rate. If you end up with $100,000, how much is x?” The subjects 
are not allowed to use a calculator or make calculation on paper when answering these 
questions.  
The results show that 20 (18.5%) subjects made mistake in all the questions. 49 
(45.4%) answer one question correctly, 32 (29.6%) answer two correctly, and only 7 
(6.5%) correctly answer all three. Just as Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) found out that half 
the subjects answering their survey cannot make a simple calculation regarding interest 
rates over a 5-year period, it turns to be the same observation in my study, since 61 
subjects (53.5%) fail to reach the correct answer in the interest rate question. This shows 
that although we use different groups of subjects (Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) studied 
older people), subjects’ average numerical ability is not high according to the tests. 
(Table 1.22) 
To simplify, we look into two extreme cases; that is, subjects who answer all 
questions incorrectly, and those who answer all correctly. The results in Table 1.22 are 
obvious: Those who aced the numerical tests make smaller consumption errors in almost 
every case. 
(Table 1.23) 
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From Table 1.23 we can see that all the subjects who correctly answer all three 
numerical tests oversave. Interestingly, those who get them all wrong are most unlikely to 
oversave.  
(Table 1.24) 
The results in Table 1.24 show that, obviously, given their reported consumption 
level, those who answered all the questions correctly are less likely to underestimate their 
age 65 assets. And if we consider the ratio between their expected age 65 asset and the 
age 65 asset if the consumption can exactly exhaust all the resources, then this ratio is 
generally larger and closer to 1 for the high numeracy group, which means the high 
numeracy groups’ expectations are less likely to be biased from the assets they should 
have at age 65. 
(Table 1.25) 
 In Table 1.25, if subjects exhaust all their resources, the ratio should be 1. 
However, the ratio for the low-numeracy subjects in Case 1 is far larger than 1, meaning 
the subjects with low-numeracy spend much more than the amount that would exhaust 
their resources ($2,000,000). 
(Table 1.26) 
(Table 1.27) 
Tables 1.26 and 1.27 show the results of estimating Models 1-5. The R-bar square in 
Model 1 is obviously larger for the high-numeracy subjects. The constant term in Model 
2 is closer to zero for the high-numeracy subjects. The difference between the 
coefficients of asset and earning in Model 3 is the largest among those who didn’t get any 
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numerical test correct. Therefore, those with low-numeracy are less likely to equally 
value a dollar in asset as a dollar in labor earning. These results again may be evidence 
that the high-numeracy subjects’ consumption behavior more closely follows the life 
cycle model.  
In Models 4 and 5, the coefficients of resources are smaller for the low-numeracy 
subjects (those correctly answering none of the questions or one question) than for the 
higher ones, though the difference is small. That is, high-numeracy subjects are more 
likely to make smaller mistakes when the resources are high. 
1.5.8.2 By Subjects’ Own Reported Math Ability 
Subjects were asked to place their math ability in one of five categories: very strong, 
strong, average, weak, or very weak. To simplify, I categorize their responses into two 
groups: those who reported they are strong or very strong in math as “high math ability,” 
and others as “not high.” Their consumption errors are listed in Table 1.28. 
(Table 1.28) 
Table 1.28 tells us that those with low numerical ability get small consumption error 
in Case 1 versus Case 3, but larger ones in Case 2 versus Case 4 (when resources are 
higher). This is consistent with the result derived in Table 1.27, that high-numeracy 
subjects are more likely to make smaller consumption errors when the resources are high.  
(Table 1.29) 
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 Table 1.29 lists the percentage of subjects by the size of their consumption errors. 
In both the high and low resources cases, there are more low-numerical subjects who 
make consumption errors larger than 40%, especially in the high resources cases.  
(Table 1.30) 
Now, we examine which group oversaves. In all cases but for Case 3, there are more 
reported high math ability subjects who oversave than low math ones. That is, if we 
consider the percentage of people oversaving in each group, the high math ability ones 
dominate. 
(Table 1.31) 
(Table 1.32) 
 From Table 1.31, the high math ability subjects are less likely to underestimate 
the assets they have at age 65 (given their reported consumption level). Also, the high 
math group’s expected age 65 assets are closer to the age 65 assets they should have if 
they exactly exhaust the resources at their death. This is consistent with the results in 
Section 1.5.8.1. Interestingly, Table 1.32 shows that the ratio of reported annual 
consumption to annual consumption that exhausts resources for high math group is 
generally higher. Combining the results from Table 1.29, we may conclude that even 
though more high math ability subjects oversave, the average consumption in this group 
is higher than the low math ability group.  
 Now consider the Models 1-5: 
(Table 1.33) 
(Table 1.34) 
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Several results contradict our common sense in this analysis. First, the R-bar square 
in Model 1 is smaller for the high math ability subjects. Second, in Model 2, the constant 
term is closer to zero for the low math ability subjects. Lastly, the difference in 
coefficients A and E is larger for the high math ability subjects, which means the high 
math ability subjects are less likely to value a dollar in asset as a dollar in labor earning. 
In Models 4 and 5, the effect of resources on consumption error is small and 
generally insignificant in both categories.  
There might be multiple reasons why the consumption behavior of the reported low 
math ability group fits the LCPIH better. One reason might be that the evaluation of one’s 
own math ability varies greatly across age, gender and race. According to the data, only 
23.68% female students report their math level as “strong” or “very strong,” while 49.28% 
male students report their math level as “strong” or “very strong”; only 38.36% US 
citizens report their math level as “strong” or “very strong,” while 44.12% international 
students report their math level as “strong” or “very strong.” Therefore, by asking 
subjects to evaluate their own math ability may not be an accurate indicator of their real 
math level.  
1.5.8.3 By Subjects’ SAT, ACT or GRE Test Scores 
Since subjects took different tests (some only took one of SAT, ACT or GRE; some took 
several), I divide the subjects into two groups: those who fall into the lower 50% in all 
the subjects taken the same test are put into the “low numeracy” group, others in the 
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“high numeracy” group. If a subject took both SAT and ACT (or SAT and GRE), only 
his/her SAT scores are taken into account. 
(Table 1.35) 
(Table 1.36) 
Interestingly, those who fall into the “low numeracy” group seem to perform better 
than those in the “high numeracy” group: they make smaller consumption errors in 
almost every case. However, a larger fraction of low level subjects make sizable mistakes 
in Cases 1 versus 3 (the low resource cases). 
(Table 1.37) 
From Tables 1.37 we can see that it is equally likely for the two groups oversave. 
There is no obvious difference in saving behavior between these two groups. 
(Table 1.38) 
(Table 1.39) 
       Compared with the low test score group, the high test score group is less likely to 
underestimate their age 65 assets, but the difference is small. 
If we consider Models1, 2 and 3: 
(Table 1.40) 
Similar to Section 1.5.8.2, the R-bar square in Model 1 is closer to 1 for the low-
numeracy group. In Model 2 constants for both categories are significantly far from zero. 
In Model 3, again, the high numeracy subjects have larger differences between the 
coefficients of A and E. 
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For Models 4 and 5 in which consumption errors are dependent variables, the effect 
of resources is small and insignificant in both categories. 
(Table 1.41) 
1.5.9 Do People with Higher Financial Literacy Make Smaller Consumption Errors? 
Some questions related to subjects’ financial literacy are also asked, such as whether they 
know what the present value is, whether they know how to calculate the present value of 
a cash flow, and whether they know how to compound returns. 
(Table 1.42) 
The results in Table 1.42 is quite obvious: in almost every case, the average 
consumption error gradually reduces as subjects’ financial literacy increases.  
(Table 1.43) 
Generally, the percentage of people with large mistakes is greater among subjects 
with fewer correct financial test answers. Combined with the results in Table 1.42 we can 
conclude that those with high financial literacy generally make smaller consumption 
errors. 
(Table 1.44) 
It is hard to draw a solid conclusion from Table 1.44 whether there are more 
oversavers in the high financial literacy group, since the distribution does not conform as 
subjects’ financial literacy increases.  
(Table 1.45) 
(Table 1.46) 
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From Tables 1.45 and 1.46, it is equally likely for different financial literacy groups 
to underestimate their age 65 assets.  
(Table 1.47) 
(Table 1.48) 
By testing Models 1-5, we can see from Tables 1.47 and 1.48 that R-bar square in 
Model 1 is generally closer to 1 for the high financial literacy group. The constant term in 
Model 2 is much smaller for the highest financial literacy group (all answers “yes”) than 
the lowest financial literacy group. The coefficients in front of asset and earning in Model 
3, however, do not show this obvious trend.  
     The effect of resources to consumption errors is small and insignificant for all groups. 
1.6. Conclusion Some interesting results are obtained from this experiment. The assumption is that if people’s consumption follows the LCPIH theory, they should make the same consumption choice when facing the same present value of resources and the same interest rate. Also, from the difference of the consumption choices while given the same amount of resources (though different assets and earnings combination), we can derive subjects’ consumption error as a measurement of how well the consumption follows the standard life cycle model. However, the data suggests that some of the subjects make a large difference in the consumption level they choose when facing the same assets. They do not expect their consumption totally based on the ratio between present value of resources. Furthermore, people hardly value one dollar in earning equally with one dollar in assets. From the aspect of all subjects, 
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consumption errors are more widespread across subjects in the low resource case than in the high resource cases. An overwhelming majority of people oversave, which is similar to the finding of Johnson, et al. (1987). We can also see that more people oversave in the high resource cases than in the low resource cases. When subjects are asked to estimate the assets they expect to have at age 65, they generally underestimate those assets. And over 50% of subjects choose consumption that varies across age (or do not smooth their consumption path). If a subject’s parents are good savers, the subject makes significantly smaller consumption 
errors, especially in the low resource cases. Asians make significantly larger consumption 
errors in the high resource case. 
Differences exist across genders: the average and absolute average consumption 
errors for men are generally smaller than those for women. However, more men than 
women do not exhaust their resources at the end of their death.  
As subjects’ numerical ability is taken into account using three approaches, it is 
obvious that those who are correct in all the numerical tests provided in this experiment 
make smaller average consumption errors in almost every case. For those with higher 
numerical test scores, their R-bar square in Model 1 is closer to unity, and their intercept 
term in Model 2 is closer to zero, which means that their consumption behavior more 
closely follows the standard life cycle model. Those with higher numerical test scores are 
also more likely to equally value a dollar in asset as a dollar in labor earnings, and they 
are less likely to underestimate their age 65 assets. 
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However, such obvious results on consumption errors can hardly be derived if we 
consider subjects’ own reported math ability, though it has been shown that the higher the 
subjects’ own reported math ability is, the less likely they will exhaust their resources 
before they die, and less likely to underestimate their assets at age 65. Interesting results 
are obtained if we consider subjects’ SAT, ACT, or GRE scores: those who fall into the 
“low numeracy” group in these tests seem to perform better than those in the “high 
numeracy” group, since they make smaller consumption errors in almost every case. But 
those falling into the low numeracy group are more likely to underestimate their age 65 
assets. 
Obvious results can be seen if we categorize subjects by their financial literacy as 
well: the average consumption error gradually reduces as subjects’ financial literacy 
increases, and the distribution of people with large mistakes decreases as their correct 
answers in financial test questions increases. By comparing the highest financial literacy 
and lowest literacy groups, the R-bar square in Model 1 is closer to 1, and the intercept 
for Model 2 is smaller (in absolute value) for the highest financial literacy group. 
However, it is equally likely for people with different financial literacy levels to 
underestimate their age 65 assets.  
 These results have very important policy implications. They provide experimental 
foundation regarding why tax policies may be important. If people cannot correctly 
expect their life time consumption, and do not smooth their consumption path according 
to their total life time resource, then tax policies can change consumption because they 
change the timing of income. As discussed in Johnson, et al. (1987):  
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 “Since people oversave and undervalue their future income streams, a fully 
funded, actuarially fair social security system that provides future benefits in exchange 
for current payroll taxes will depress consumption and increase saving if future benefits 
are undervalued. Alternatively, a cut in current income tax receipts coupled with an 
equal present value increase in future income tax receipts will stimulate consumption and 
lower saving”. (Johnson, et. al., 1987) 
 Since the goal of the US government in recent years is to stimulate consumption, 
a cut in current income tax and increase in future income tax might be a useful approach 
because the underestimation of money streams in the future may make the increase of 
future taxes seems lower than the decreases of current income taxes. In other words, 
people may feel they have more to spend over their lifetime (which is actually untrue), 
and it may make people willing to consume more today. 
1.7  Appendix: Full Questionnaire1  
Please complete this questionnaire without using a calculator, without using a 
computer, and without making mathematical calculations on paper. Just write down 
your best intuitive answers to the questions. 
 
We do not record your name, so this questionnaire is entirely anonymous, and your 
responses will be used only for research.   
 
                                                        
1 Approved by the Institutional Review Board of Boston University. 
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In the first part of this questionnaire, we ask you to forget your personal circumstances 
and simply place yourself in the hypothetical situation we describe. 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
Lizzy Xiaojia Zhang 
PhD candidate of economics, Boston University 
 
1. Please indicate the current time (e.g., 12:32)  ________ 
 
2. Suppose you have just turned 40-years old, will never marry, have no children, and 
will die for sure the day you turn 100.  
 
Your economic world entails no uncertainty whatsoever.  There is no inflation, no 
changes in any prices of any goods, no medical expenses, no taxes, no government 
pensions or other benefits, and no emergency expenditures. You have no housing 
expenses (they are covered by your rich uncle).  You face a fixed 3 percent interest rate at 
which you can invest as well as borrow money.   
 
You want to spend all your money only on yourself before you die. 
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Your current assets total $645,797. You earn $77,769 from working each year through 
age 65, when you retire. So your labor earnings at age 65 and thereafter are zero. 
 
How much will you choose to spend this year?   _______ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 60?  _____ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 80?  _____ 
 
3.  Your situation is the same as in question 2, but you have $1,147,711 in assets and earn 
$106,373 per year.  
 
How much will you choose to spend this year?   _______ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 60?  _____ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 80?  _____ 
 
4.  Your situation is the same as in question 2 and your current assets total $191,331, but 
you now earn $103,868 per year. 
 
How much will you choose to spend this year?   _______ 
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How much will you choose to spend when you are 60?  _____ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 80?  _____ 
 
5.  Your situation is the same as in question 2, but you have $754,801 in assets and earn 
$128,937 per year.  
 
How much will you choose to spend this year?   _______ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 60?  _____ 
 
How much will you choose to spend when you are 80?  _____ 
 
6. Your situation is the same as question 2, and your current assets total $645,797. You 
earn $77,769 each year, but you want to spend exactly the same amount each year 
through age 100.   
 
How much is that amount?  ________ 
 
How much assets will you have at age 65? ________ 
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7. Your situation is the same as question 2, and you have $1,147,711 in assets and earn 
$106,373 per year, but you want to spend exactly the same amount each year through age 
100.   
 
How much is that amount?  ________ 
 
How much assets will you have at age 65? ________ 
 
8. Your situation is the same as question 2, and your current assets total $191,331, but 
you now earn $103,868 per year, but you want to spend exactly the same amount each 
year through age 100.   
 
How much is that amount?  ________ 
 
How much assets will you have at age 65? ________ 
 
9. Your situation is the same as question 2, and you have $754,801 in assets and earn 
$128,937 per year, but you want to spend exactly the same amount each year through age 
100.   
 
How much is that amount?  ________ 
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How much assets will you have at age 65? ________ 
 
10. Suppose you have $300 in your account. The account earns 10% interest per year. 
How much will you have in your account at the end of the third year? __________  
 
11. You have two options:  
 
A) get $120 at the end of this year for sure, or 
 
B) get $115 now.  
 
There is no inflation and the interest rate is 3%.  
 
Which option would you prefer? ________________ 
 
12.  Suppose you invest x dollar for one year with 5% interest rate. If you end up with 
$100,000, how much is x? _______________ 
 
13.  Suppose you have a lottery ticket that pays $100,000 with a 10 percent probability 
and $0 with a 90 percent probability. 
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What is the lowest amount for which you would sell your lottery ticket? 
_______________ 
 
Please provide the following background information. 
 
14. Indicate your gender (M for male and F for female)   __________ 
 
15. In which year were you born?      ___________ 
 
16. In what country were you born?  _________  
 
17. Are you a U.S. Citizen? _________  
 
18. How many years have you lived in the U.S.? _________ 
 
19. What is your major field of concentration? ___________ 
 
20. When you were 14 years old, was your family            ___________ 
 
A) Very Rich    B) Rich     C) Neither rich nor poor    D) Poor   E) Very Poor 
 
21.  What is the highest grade of school your father completed?  ____________ 
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A) No schooling  B) some primary schooling  C) completed primary school D) some 
secondary schooling  E) completed secondary school or equivalent   F) some college  G) 
college degree  H) MA I) PhD or professional degree   J) Don’t Know 
 
22.  What is the highest grade of school your mother completed?  ____________ 
 
A) No schooling  B) some primary schooling  C) completed primary school D) some 
secondary schooling  E) completed secondary school or equivalent   F) some college  
G)college degree  H) MA I) PhD or professional degree J) Don’t Know 
 
23.  Indicate if you are a    _____________ 
 
A) Freshman 
B) Sophomore 
C) Junior 
D) Senior 
E) Masters student 
F) PhD student 
 
24.  Indicate your race/ethnic background    _______________ 
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A) White 
B) African American 
C) Hispanic 
D) Asian 
E) Mixed background 
 
25. When you were young, how often did either or both or your parents talk to you about 
saving? _______________ 
 
A) Very often 
B) Often 
C) Sometimes 
D) Rarely 
E) Never 
 
26. When you were young, how often did either or both of your parents talk to you about 
financial matters? _______________ 
 
A) Very often 
B) Often 
C) Sometimes 
D) Rarely 
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E) Never 
 
27.  Do you consider your father a  _______________ 
 
A) Very good saver? 
B) Pretty good saver? 
C) Average saver? 
D) Poor saver? 
E) Don’t know or not applicable 
 
28.  Do you consider your mother a  _______________ 
 
A) Very good saver? 
B) Pretty good saver? 
C) Average saver? 
D) Poor saver? 
E) Don’t know or not applicable 
 
29.  Are you  ____________ 
  
A) Very strong in math 
       B) Strong in math 
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       C) Average in math 
       D) Weak in math 
       E) Very weak in math 
 
30. Please specify  
 
Your verbal SAT score  ____________ 
Your math SAT score ____________ 
Your English ACT score ____________ 
Your math ACT score ____________ 
Your verbal GRE score ____________ 
Your quantitative GRE score ____________ 
  
31. Do you understand the instructions at the beginning? 
 A) Yes       B) No   C) Unsure 
 
32. Do you know what present value is? ____________  
 A) Yes       B) No    C) Unsure 
 
33. Do you know how to calculate the present value of a cash flow? ____________ 
 A) Yes       B) No    C) Unsure 
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34. Do you know how to compound returns? ____________ 
 A) Yes       B) No    C) Unsure 
 
35. Did you find it hard to ignore earnings and other risks in answering the questions? 
____________ 
 A) Yes       B) No    C)Somewhat 
 
36. Time you completed the survey (e.g., 12:56)  ____________   
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of subjects’ consumption given the same resource level 
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the Subjects’ This Year Consumption Given Different 
Resource Levels 
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the Subjects’ Evenly Spent Consumption Given Different 
Resource Levels 
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Coefficients in Model (2) 
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Figure 1.5: Coefficients in Model (3) 
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Table 1.1:  Consumption Errors* Measured as Percentage Deviation 
Average Median Absolute Difference Maximum Minimum Number of 
Observatio
ns 
Case 
1 vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 108 
26.4 2.5 0.0 0.0 56.7 29.6 700.0 614.5 -99.9 -97.5 
*Consumption errors are measured by percentage differences, with the consumption in the second case minus the consumption in the first case in the 
numerator and the first case in the denominator. For example, consumption error Case 1 vs 3 is measured by (consumption in Case 3-consumption in 
Case 1)/ Consumption in Case 1 
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Table 1.2:  Distribution of Subjects by Size of Mistake 
Percentage of subjects in total 
subjects 
Case 1 vs 3 Case 2 vs 4 
Percentage mistake (%) 20+ 40+ 20+ 40+ 
Fraction of Subjects (%) 63.9 39.8 46.3 25.9   
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Table 1.3: Fraction of Subjects by Size of Percentage Consumption Error in Case 1 and Case 3 
 
  *percentile included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consum
ption 
Error 
(%) 
<-
100 
-
100* 
～-
75 
-75* 
～-
50 
-50* 
～-
25 
-25* 
～-
10 
-10* 
～-5 
-
5*～
0 
0 0～5* 
5～
10* 
10～
25* 
25～
50* 
50～
75* 
75
～
100
* 
>1
00
* 
Fraction 
of 
Subjects 
(%) 
0.0 2.8 4.6 11.1 9.3 0.9 0.0 18.5 1.9 2.8 9.3 17.6 7.4 1.9 12.0 
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Table 1.4:  Fraction of Subjects by Size of Percentage Consumption Error in Case 2 and Case 4 
Consumption  
Error (%) 
<-
100 
-
100
* 
～-
75 
-75* 
～-
50 
-50* 
～-
25 
-25* 
～-
10 
-10* 
～-5 
-
5*～
0 
0 0～5* 
5～
10* 
10～
25* 
25～
50* 
50～
75* 
75～
100* 
>1
00
* 
Fraction of  
Subjects (%) 2.8 2.8 7.4 6.5 18.5 4.6 0.9 20.4 0 3.7 14.8 12.0 7.4 4.6 0.0 
*percentile included 
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Table 1.5:  Fraction of Subjects by Consumption Difference in Each 2 Cases (for This Year Consumption) 
(%) <0 0 0～10* 10～20* 20～30* 30～40* 40～50 50 
50～
60* 60～70* 70～80* 80～90* 90～100* >100 
1 vs 2 
(%) 
  1.9   3.7 0.0   6.5 10.2 11.1 7.4 10
.2 
2.8 6.5   3.7 1.9 13.0 21.3 
3 vs 2 
(%) 
  8.3 13.0 4.6 16.7   4.6   3.7 0.0   
7.
4 
3.7 4.6   4.6 0.9   9.3 18.5 
3 vs 4 
(%) 
14.8   6.5 0.9 13.0 13.0   4.6 2.8   
7.
4 
1.9 5.6   4.6 0.9 10.2 13.9 
1 vs 4 
(%) 
10.2 12.0 0.0   4.6   5.6   9.3 8.3   
4.
6 
4.6 8.3 10.2 2.8   8.3 15.7 
*percentile included. Consumption differences are measured by percentage differences, with the consumption in the second case minus the consumption 
in the first case in the numerator and the first case in the denominator. For example, consumption error Case 1 vs2 is measured by (consumption in Case 
2-consumption in Case 1)/ Consumption in Case 1 
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Table 1.6:  Fraction of Subjects by Consumption Difference in Each 2 Cases (for the Evenly Spent Consumption) 
(%) <0 0 0～10* 
10～
20* 
20～
30* 
30～
40* 
40～
50 50 
50～
60* 
60～
70* 
70～
80* 
80～
90* 
90～
100* >100 
1 vs 
2 
(%) 
  5.6   7.4 0.0   6.5  8.3 13.9 5.6 9.3 6.5   3.7  4.6 0.9 9.3 18.5 
3 vs 
2 
(%) 
  6.5 11.1 6.5   7.4  7.4 13.0 4.6 5.6 5.6 6.5  1.9 0.9 6.5 19.4 
3 vs 
4 
(%) 
11.1  7.4 0.0 13.0 14.8   9.3 6.5 3.7 3.7 3.7  5.6 0.0 6.5 17.6 
1 vs 
4 
(%) 
13.8  6.5 1.9  7.4  7.4   8.3 2.8 4.6 4.6 6.5 11.1 1.9 5.6 23.1 
*percentile included 
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Table 1.7:  Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question 
Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
79.6 82.4 77.8 81.5 108 
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Table 1.8:  Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting Resources 
Median  
Ratio of 
Expected 
Age 65 
Asset to: Case 1 Case 2 
 
  
 
  
Case 3 
 
 
 
 
Case 4 
 
Number of 
 
Observations 
Actual Age 
65 Assets 
with 
Smoothing 0.462 0.477 
 
 
 
0.369 
 
 
 
0.449 
 
 
 
108 
Age 65 
Asset If 
Exhausting 
Resources 0.644 0.644 
 
 
 
0.628 
 
 
 
0.644 
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Table 1.9: Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption That Exhausts Resources 
Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
1.93 1.29 0.82 0.82 108 
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Table 1.10:  Fraction of Subjects by Different Age Consumption 
Different Age 
Consumption 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Age 60 consumption > 
Age 40 consumption 
27.8%  
(16,366.7*) 
23.1%  
(67,690.0) 
25.9%  
(58,714.3) 
26.9%  
(50,844.8) 
Age 60 consumption = 
Age 40 consumption 
41.7%  43.5%  43.5%  41.7%  
Age 60 consumption < 
Age 40 consumption 
30.6%  
(-31,764.6) 
33.3%  
(-64,406.3) 
30.6%  
(-17,549.5) 
31.5% 
 (-42,235.3) 
Age 80 consumption > 
Age 60 consumption 
25.0% 
 (34,314.8) 
33.3%  
(279,481.9) 
28.7% 
 (101,025.8) 
24.1%  
(158,238.5) 
Age 80 consumption = 
Age 60 consumption 
38.9%  34.3%  45.4%  40.7%  
Age 80 consumption < 
Age 60 consumption 
36.1%  
(-20,751.5) 
32.4%  
(-20,839.2) 
25.9% 
 (-17,450.1) 
35.2% 
 (-23,624.9) 
    *Average consumption difference in each category is in the bracket 
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Table 1.11:  Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors) in Models 1,2,32 for all Subjects 
Model Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
1  0.042** 
 (0.008) 
  0.055 432 
2 69.466 
(105,581.900) 
0.015  
(0.041) 
  -0.002 
3 666.848 
(29,568.500) 
 0.050**  
(0.015) 
0.022  
(0.016) 
0.029 
  ** Significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
2 Model 1: C=aR+u 
  Model 2: C=a+bR+u 
  Model 3: C=a+bA+cE+u 
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Table 1.12:   Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors) in Models 4,53 for all Subjects 
Model Const Resource R-bar square Number of Observations 
4  4.65e-08*  
(2.50e-08) 
0.011 216 
5 0.742  
(0.322) 
-2.39e-07*  
(1.26e-07) 
0.012 
  *Significant at 10 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Model 4: CE=aR+u 
  Model 5: CE=a+bR+u 
57 
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Table 1.13:  The Effect of Characteristic Variables on Absolute Consumption Error 
Independent Variables Coefficient (Standard error) 
Absolute 
Consumption Error 
in Case 1-3 
Absolute 
Consumption 
Error in Case 2-
4 
Female 0.260 
(0.192) 
-0.081 
(0.154) 
Age 0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
Education Level -0.028 
(0.064) 
-0.055 
(0.051) 
Non-US -0.214 
(0.218) 
-0.201 
(0.176) 
Risk Neutral 0.150 
(0.180) 
0.119 
(0.145) 
Asian 0.043 
(0.213) 
0.372** 
(0.171) 
Black, Hispanic or 
Mixed 
-0.044 
(0.254) 
0.124 
(0.205) 
Saving or financial 
issue often talked 
-0.104 
(0.182) 
-0.013 
(0.146) 
Parent(s) good saver -0.410** 
(0.202) 
-0.085 
(0.163) 
Father's Education 
Level 
-0.017 
(0.028) 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
Mother's Education 
Level 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
0.016 
(0.023) 
Good at math (self-
evaluated) 
0.120 
(0.191) 
-0.234 
(0.154) 
Correct number in math 
test 
-0.083 
(0.106) 
0.035 
(0.085) 
Correct number in 
financial test 
-0.059 
(0.091) 
-0.021 
(0.073) 
Constant 1.949* 
(1.090) 
1.161 
(0.878) 
Number of 
Observations 
100 100 
** Significant at 5 significance level 
* Significant at 10 significance level 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.14:  Consumption Errors Measured as Percentage Deviation by Gender 
Gender 
Average Median Absolute Difference Maximum Minimum 
Number 
of 
Observati
ons 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Male  
(%) 24.6 12.0 4.7 0.0 49.6 29.9 700.0 614.4 -98.1 -97.5 69 
Female 
(%) 29.7 -14.3 0.0 -3.8 69.2 29.1 419.3 50.0 -99.9 -91.3 39 
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Table 1.15:  Distribution of Subjects by Gender and Size of Mistake 
Absolute Consumption 
Error(%) 
Percentage of subjects in total subjects 
Case 1 vs 3 Case 2 vs 4 
20+ 40+ 20+ 40+ 
Male (%) 62.3 34.8 40.6 17.4 
Female (%) 66.7 48.7 56.4 41.0 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.16:  Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question 
Gender Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of Observations 
Male (%) 81.2 85.5 78.3 81.2 69 
Female (%) 76.9 76.9 76.9 82.1 39 
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Table 1.17: Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting Resources By Gender 
Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to:  
Gender 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of Observations 
Actual Age 65 with Smoothing Male 0.472 0.476 0.338 0.478 69 
Female 0.350 0.478 0.440 0.288 39 
Age 65 Asset If Exhausting Resources Male 0.708 0.721 0.612 0.644 69 
Female 0.545 0.601 0.644 0.537 39 
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Table 1.18:  Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption that Exhausts Resources by Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
Male 2.399 1.356 0.777 0.795 69 
Female 1.095 1.171 0.898 0.861 39 
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Table 1.19:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) in Models 1,2,34 for Men 
Model Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
1  0.045**  
(0.012) 
   0.041 
276 2 111,065.6  (162,286.4) 
0.002  
(0.064) 
  -0.004 
3 249,364.1  
(188,666.5) 
 0.102  
(0.094) 
-1.951 
(1.774) 
 0.000 
   ** Significant at 5 percent significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
4 Model 1: C=aR+u 
  Model 2: C=a+bR+u 
  Model 3: C=a+bA+cE+u 
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Table 1.20:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) in Models 1,2,3 for Women 
Model Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar square Number of Observations 
1  0.036**  
(0.004) 
  0.310 
156 2 -4,132.385  (56,483.920) 
0.038*  
(0.022) 
  0.012 
3 31,084.73   
(65,771.170) 
 0.064*  
(0.033) 
0.158  
(0.619) 
0.013 
  ** Significant at 5 percent significance level 
  *Significant at 10 percent significance level 
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Table 1.21:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) in Models 4,55 by Gender 
Model Gender Const Resource R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
4 
Male  6.56e-08**  
(3.22e-08) 
 0.022 138 
Female  1.27e-08  
(3.92e-08) 
-0.012 78 
5 
Male 0.496  
(0.419) 
-1.25e-07  
(1.64e-07) 
-0.003 138 
Female 1.177**  
(0.494) 
-4.40e-07**  
(1.94e-07) 
 0.051 78 
   ** Significant at 10 percent significance level 
   *Significant at 5 percent significance level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
5 Model 4: CE=aR+u 
  Model 5: CE=a+bR+u 
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Table 1.22:  Consumption Errors Measured as Percentage Deviation by Numerical Test 
Numerical 
test score Average Median 
Absolute 
Difference Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
Observatio
ns 
 Case 1 vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4  
0 42.8 -9.7 14.6 -5.9 70.5 32. 2 419.3 100.0 -98.8 -69.9 20 
1 11.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 48.0 23.8 419.3 51.3 -95.5 -90.0 49 
2 37.1 10.1 0.0 0.0 64.7 37.2 700.0 614.5 -99.9 -97.5 32 
3 33.3 -2.9 25.0 0.0 41.5 28.5 150.0 66.7 -28.6 -60.0 7 
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Table 1.23: The Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question by Numerical Test 
Numerical test 
score 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of 
Observations 
0   65.0  70.0  55.0  70.0 20 
1   81.6  89.8  81.6  87.8 49 
2   81.3  78.1  84.4  75.0 32 
3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 7 
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Table 1.24:  Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting Resources by Numerical Test 
 
Median Ratio of 
Expected Age 
65 Asset to: 
 
 
Numerical test 
score Case 1 Case 2 
 
 
 
Case 3 
 
 
 
Case 4 
 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Actual Age 65 
with Smoothing 
0 0.477 0.458 0.303 0.410 20 
1 0.367 0.423 0.369 0.451 49 
2 0.450 0.489 0.383 0.449 32 
3 0.520 0.552 0.550 0.536 7 
Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting 
Resources 
0 0.530 0.547 0.151 0.429 20 
1 0.644 0.644 0.530 0.644 49 
2 0.720 0.768 0.773 0.859 32 
3 0.902 0.859 0.902 0.644 7 
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Table 1.25:  Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption That Exhausts Resources by 
Numerical Test 
 
Numerical test 
score Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
0 6.308 1.131 0.946 0.887 20 
1 1.130 0.921 0.833 0.837 49 
2 0.698 2.069 0.741 0.786 32 
3 0.627 0.755 0.741 0.643 7 
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Table 1.26:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 1,2,36 by Numerical Test 
Model Correct Number Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar square Number of Observations 
1 0  0.066*  
(0.038) 
  0.024 80 
1  0.033** (0.004)   0.250 196 
2  0.044** 
(0.012) 
  0.084 128 
3  0.025** 
(0.002) 
  0.904 28 
2 0 567,577.500  
(493,197.800) 
-0.153 
(0.193) 
  -0.005 80 
1 22,214.550  
(52,444) 
0.024 
(0.021) 
  0.002 196 
2 -153,584.300  
(159,360.500) 
0.103 
(0.063) 
  0.013 128 
3 -3,285.714 
 (20,380.120) 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
  0.268 28 
3 0 901,759.500 
 (573,387.100) 
 0.089 
(0.287) 
-7.452 
(5.393) 
-0.001 80 
1 46,047.060  
(61,151.520) 
 0.042 
(0.031) 
0.082 
(0.575) 
-0.000 196 
2 -58,208.760 
 (185,614.400) 
 0.172* 
(0.093) 
0.422 
(1.746) 
0.013 128 
3 -1,483.740  
(24,197.960) 
 0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.433* 
(0.228) 
0.239 28 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*Significant at 10 percent level                                                         
6 Model 1: C=aR+u 
  Model 2: C=a+bR+u 
  Model 3: C=a+bA+cE+u 
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Table 1.27:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 4,57 by Numerical Test 
Model Correct Number Const Resource R-bar square Observations 
4 0   4.35e-08  
(5.50e-08) 
-0.010 40 
1   2.60e-08  
(2.49e-08) 
 0.001 98 
2   8.03e-08  
(6.63e-08) 
 0.007 64 
3   4.46e-08  
(5.56e-08) 
-0.026 14 
5 0 1.479**  
(0.684) 
-5.25e-07*  
(2.68e-07) 
 0.068 40 
1 0.285  
(0.324) 
-8.37e-08  
(1.27e-07) 
-0.006 98 
2 0.911  
(0.861) 
-2.70e-07  
(3.38e-07) 
-0.006 64 
3 1.059  
(0.687) 
-3.63e-07  
(2.70e-07) 
 0.059 14 
  ** Significant at 5 percent level 
  *Significant at 10 percent level 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
7 Model 4: CE=aR+u 
  Model 5: CE=a+bR+u 
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Table 1.28: Consumption Errors Measured as Percentage Deviation by Own Reported Math Ability 
Math 
ability 
Average Median Absolute Difference Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
Observatio
ns Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Not 
high(%) 24.3 6.6 2.3 0.0 52.7 35.6 480.0 614.5 -98.8 -91.3 64 
High(%) 30.8 -2.2 0.0 0.0 63.3 20.2 700.0 51.3 -99.9 -97.5 43 
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Table 1.29: Distribution of Subjects by Own Reported Math Ability and Size of Mistake 
Absolute 
Consumption 
Error(%) 
Percentage of Subjects in Total Subjects 
Case 1 vs 3 Case 2 vs 4 
20+ 40+ 20+ 40+ 
Not high(%) 62.5 40.6 48.4 32.8 
High(%) 65.1 39.5 41.9 13.9  
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Table 1.30:  Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question by Own Reported Math Ability 
Math Ability Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of Observations 
Not high (%) 75.0 81.3 76.6 78.1 64 
High(%) 86.1 83.7 72.1 86.1 43 
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Table 1.31:  Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting Resources by Own Reported Math Ability 
Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to: Math Ability Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of Observations 
Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing Not high 0.432 0.408 0.334 0.431 64 
High 0.466 0.500 0.476 0.489 43 
Age 65 Asset If Exhausting Resources Not high 0.515 0.580 0.451 0.612 64 
High 0.773 0.859 0.789 0.859 43 
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Table 1.32:  Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption that Exhausts Resources by Own 
Reported Math Ability 
 
Math Ability Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
Not high 1.033 0.933 0.849 0.819 64 
High 3.283 1.827 0.783 0.827 43 
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Table 1.33:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 1,2,38 by Own Reported Math Ability 
Model Math 
Ability 
Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar 
square 
Number of 
Observations 
1 Not high  0.032  
(0.340) 
   0.340 256 
High  0.056**  
(0.020) 
   0.038 172 
2 Not high 13,985.990 
(36,540.180)   
0.027* 
 (0.014) 
   0.010 256 
High 152,959.500 
(259,710.200)   
-0.003  
(0.102) 
  -0.006 172 
3 Not high 33,564.770 
(42,577.130)   
 0.041*  
(0.021) 
 0.189  
(0.400) 
 0.009 256 
High 376,483.400 
(301,536.100)   
 0.158  
(0.151) 
-3.258  
(2.836) 
 0.001 172 
   ** Significant at 5 percent significance level 
   *Significant at 10 percent significance level 
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Table 1.34:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 4,59 by Own Reported Math Ability 
Model Math ability Const Resource R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
4 Not high   5.29e-08*  
(3.16e-08) 
 0.014 128 
High   3.77e-08  
(4.12e-08) 
-0.002 86 
5 Not high 0.588  
(0.404) 
-1.75e-07  
(1.59e-07) 
 0.002 128 
High 0.951*  
(0.528) 
-3.28e-07  
(2.07e-07) 
 0.017 86 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
9 Model 4: CE=aR+u 
  Model 5: CE=a+bR+u 
79 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.35:  Consumption Errors Measured as Percentage Deviation by Test Scores 
Test 
scores 
Average Median Absolute Difference Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
Observations 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Low(%) 9.1 -2.1 0.0 0.0 48.1 20.4 233.3 100.0 -98.8 -91.3 43 
High(%) 34.5 10.9 0.0 1.7 61.3 38.1 700.0 614.5 -98.1 -97.5 44 
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Table 1.36:  Distribution of Subjects by Test Scores and Size of Mistake 
Absolute 
Consumption 
Error(%) 
Percentage of Subjects in Total Subjects 
Case 1vs 3 Case 2 vs 4 
20+ 40+ 20+ 40+ 
Low (%) 76.7 48.8 36.4 18.2 
High (%) 54.6 29.6 47.7 25.0 
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Table 1.37:  The Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question by Test Scores 
Test Scores Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of Observations 
Low (%) 73.1 81.4 76.7 79.1 43 
High (%) 81.8 81.8 75.0 77.3 44 
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Table 1.38:   Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If Exhausting 
Resources by Test Scores 
Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 
Asset to: 
Test 
Scores 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Number of 
Observations 
Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing Low 0.423 0.489 0.316 0.440 43 
High 0.441 0.476 0.418 0.473 44 
Age 65 Asset If Exhausting 
Resources 
Low 0.547 0.644 0.580 0.644 43 
High 0.655 0.704 0.644 0.698 44   
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Table 1.39: Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption that Exhausts Resources by Test 
Scores 
 
Test Scores Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
Low 1.403 1.225 0.927 1.015 43 
High 3.125 1.633 0.832 0.768 44 
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Table 1.40:   Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 1,2,310 by Test Scores 
Model Test 
scores 
Const Resource Asset Earning R-bar 
square 
Number of 
Observatio
ns 
1 Low  0.046** 
 (0.006) 
  0.239 172 
High  0.052** 
 (0.019) 
  0.034 176 
2 Low 95,365.030** 
(30,364.530) 
0.004  
(0.015) 
  -0.006 172 
High 168,646.100 
(251,543.800) 
-0.013 
 (0.099) 
  -0.006 176 
3 Low 41,543.540 
(75,232.010) 
 0.068* 
 (0.037) 
0.159  
(0.685) 
0.009 172 
High 369,619 
(292,320) 
 0.132  
(0.146) 
-3.106  
(2.749) 
-0.001 176 
    ** Significant at 5 percent level 
    *Significant at 10 percent level 
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Table 1.41:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 4,511 by Test Scores 
Model Test Scores Const Resource R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
4 Low   9.14e-09  
(2.18e-08) 
-0.010 86 
High   7.82e-08  
(5.20e-08) 
 0.014 88 
5 Low 0.315 
(0.283) 
-1.12e-07  
(1.11e-07) 
 0.000 86 
High 0.816  
(0.674) 
-2.36e-07  
(2.64e-07) 
-0.002 88 
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Table 1.42:  Percentage of Consumption Errors by Subjects’ Financial Literacy 
Financial 
Test 
Scores 
Average Median Absolute Difference Maximum 
Minimu
m 
Number 
of 
Observati
ons 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 
vs 3 
Case 2 
vs 4 
Case 1 vs 
3  
0 49.9 -14.7 12.5 -3.3 74.4 31.0 700.0 50.0 -98.8 41 
1 23.0 18.4  0.0  0.0 56.7 41.5 479.9 614.5 -99.9 32 
2  5.4  9.5  0.0  7.1 38.6 20.3 100.0   51.3 -98.0 19 
3 -1.9  6.8  0.0  8.3 32.9 13.4   60.0   33.3  -9.2 16 
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Table 1.43:  Distribution of Subjects by Size of Mistake by Financial Literacy 
Absolute 
Consumption 
Error(%) 
Percentage of Subjects in Total Subjects 
Case 1 vs 3 Case 2 vs 4 
20+ 40+ 20+ 40+ 
0 68.3 41.5 56.1 39.0 
1 62.5 37.5 46.9 21.9 
2 57.9 47.4 36.8 26.3 
3 62.5 31.3 31.3 0.0 
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Table 1.44:  Percentage of Subjects Oversaving in Response to Smoothing Question by Financial Literacy 
 
Financial Test Score Case 1 Case 2 
 
Case 3 
 
Case 4 
Number of 
Observations 
0 80.5 80.5 78.1 80.5 41 
1 84.4 84.4 81.3 81.3 32 
2 79.0 84.2 89.5 84.2 19 
3 68.8 81.3 62.5 81.3 16 
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Table 1.45:  Median Ratio of Expected Age 65 Asset to Actual Age 65 Asset with Smoothing and Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting Resources by Financial Literacy 
Median Ratio of 
Expected Age 
65 Asset to: 
Financial Test 
Score 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Number of 
Observations 
Actual Age 65 
Asset with 
Smoothing 
0 0.478 0.476 0.369 0.489 41 
1 0.367 0.444 0.373 0.431 32 
2 0.530 0.493 0.408 0.367 19 
3 0.443 0.343 0.341 0.476 16 
Age 65 Asset If 
Exhausting 
Resources 
0 0.547 0.601 0.322 0.442 41 
1 0.687 0.790 0.853 0.708 32 
2 0.773 0.859 0.741 0.816 19 
3 0.644 0.644 0.580 0.644 16 
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Table 1.46:  Average Ratio of Reported Annual Consumption to Annual Consumption with Smoothing by Financial 
Literacy 
Financial Test 
Score Case 1 Case 2 
Case 3 Case 4 
0 0.757 1.893 0.770 0.655 
1 1.217 1.114 0.965 1.067 
2 6.571 0.705 0.685 0.727 
3 0.836 0.787 0.822 0.853 
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Table 1.47:  Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 1,2,312 by Financial Literacy 
Mode
l 
Correct 
Numbe
r 
Const Resourc
e 
Asset Earning R-bar 
squar
e 
Number 
of 
Observati
ons 
1 0  0.040** 
(0.010) 
  0.090 164 
1  0.039** 
(0.006) 
  0.264 128 
2  0.058 
(0.040) 
  0.014 76 
3  0.030** 
(0.002) 
  0.786 64 
2 0 -110,563.300 
(126,396.500
) 
0.083* 
(0.050) 
  0.011 164 
1 225.111 
(75,094.330) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
  0.006 128 
2 631,401.200 
(519,425.300
) 
-0.185 
(0.204) 
  -
0.002 
76 
3 1,977.125 
(25,373.040) 
0.029** 
(0.010) 
  0.106 64 
3 0 -16,794.800 
(146,973.800
) 
 0.151** 
(0.074) 
0.099 
(1.380) 
0.014 164 
1 18,634.240 
(87,757.680) 
 0.053 
(0.044) 
0.421 
(0.825) 
-
0.001 
128 
2 976,158.300 
(604,033.300
) 
 0.064 
(0.302) 
-8.159 
(5.681) 
0.001 76 
3 -2,267.874 
(29,776.020) 
 0.026* 
(0.015) 
0.565*
* 
(0.280) 
0.093 64 
    ** Significant at 5 percent level 
    *Significant at 10 percent level                                                         
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Table 1.48: Coefficients (Standard Errors) of Models 4, 513 by Financial Literacy 
Model Math 
ability 
Const Resource R-bar square Number of 
Observations 
4 0  4.28e-08 
(4.88e-08) 
-0.003 82 
1  7.78e-08 
(5.36e-08) 
 0.017 64 
2  3.03e-08 
(2.66e-08) 
 0.008 38 
3  1.26e-08 
(2.26e-08) 
-0.022 32 
5 0 1.790** 
 (0.606) 
-6.46e-07 
(2.38e-07) 
 0.073 82 
1 0.322  
(0.701) 
-4.62e-08 
(2.75e-07) 
-0.016 64 
2 -0.027 
 (0.351) 
4.07e-08 
(1.38e-07) 
-0.025 38 
3 -0.193  
(0.297) 
8.68e-08 
(1.16e-07) 
-0.015 32 
    ** Significant at 5 percent level 
    *Significant at 10 percent level 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Effect of Soda Tax on Soda Consumption: Using a Censored Quadratic Model 
2.1 Introduction 
Obesity is a serious problem in the United States. In 2007-2008, 68 percent of adults and 
32 percent of children were either overweight or obese. In 2009-2010, the obesity rate in 
the United States was 35.5 percent among adult men and 35.8 percent among adult 
women (Flegal, et al., 2010, 2012; Ogden, et al., 2010). This indicates that two in three 
Americans are overweight, and one in three Americans is suffering from obesity. Besides 
its direct effect on physical appearance, obesity may bring higher risk of diseases such as 
heart disease, cancer, obstructive sleep apnea, type 2 diabetes, and osteoarthritis (Haslam 
and James, 2005). Additionally, obesity causes substantial externalities on society by 
increasing healthcare costs (which accounts for one sixth of the US economy), and 
reducing productivity (Lakdawalla, et al., 2005, Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009). 
 Unlike most physical diseases, obesity, as an economic phenomenon, might be 
avoided through behavioral changes (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009). Given the serious 
problems created by obesity, policymakers have been focusing their efforts over the past 
few decades to create and implement policies that can control obesity by changing 
people’s behavior. According to Block (2004), soft drinks have been the single largest 
contributor of energy intake during the last decade, thus it seems logical that states have 
continued to introduce taxes on soda in an attempt to affect the obesity rate. However, 
whether these soda taxes can truly decrease soda consumption remains to be proven. 
Some researchers believe that soda taxes should be implemented (e.g., Cummings, 2010) 
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based on findings that higher prices reduce soda consumption (e.g., Brownell and Frieden, 
2009; Brownell, et al., 2009; Andreyeva, et al., 2010), causing an average reduction of 37 
calories per day for adults and 43 calories per day for children (Smith, et al., 2010). Other 
researchers found that existing taxes on soda, which are typically not much higher than 4 
percent in grocery stores, do not largely affect overall levels of soda consumption or 
obesity rates (e.g., Sturm, et al., 2010; Marlow and Shiers, 2010), or the impact is small 
in magnitude (e.g. Fletcher, et al., 2010a, 2010b). 
 The previous literature in this field, which will be summarized in full detail in 
Section 2.2, falls into three categories. The first is a summary or review of obesity issues, 
tax policies, and previous literature, without any estimation results of their own (e.g. 
Malik, et al., 2006; Chriqui, et al., 2008; Brownell and Frieden, 2009; Brownell, et al., 
2009, Yanamadala, et al., 2012; Efrat and Efrat, 2012). The second category contains 
literature that simply uses an OLS or GLM model with tax or price as a regressor (e.g. 
Kuchler, et al., 2005; Fletcher, et al., 2010; Sturm, et al., 2010). The third category 
reviews literature that uses a demand system, such as the Translog Demand System, the 
Rotterdam demand system, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), or the Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) (e.g., Kinnucan, et al., 2001; Yen, et al. 2004; 
Zheng and Kaiser, 2008; Zhen, et al., 2011; Lin, et al.,2011; Dharmasena and Capps, 
2012). 
Regardless of the approaches used, almost all previous literature that builds a 
demand system fails to consider the individuals or households that do not purchase soda. 
For example, in the study by Kuchler, et al. (2005), the dependent variable they chose 
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(the quantity demanded of snack food) disregards the possibility that the demand could 
be zero. Moreover, of studies that use the Translog demand system, Rotterdam, AIDS, or 
QUAIDS model to estimate demand for sugar-sweetened beverages, a majority used 
nominal expenditure on beverages as the independent variable (e.g. Lin, et al., 2011) 
without testing its endogeneity. Tests should be given on whether these expenditure 
variables are exogenous to the dependent variables (LaFrance, 1991, Talijaard, et al., 
2004), such as budget share of sugar-sweetened beverage on total expenditures. 
Furthermore, none of the studies using Translog, AIDS, or QUAIDS models introduced 
household characteristics as explanatory variables.  
The data used in the previous literature came mainly from the following resources: 
NC Nielsen Homescan Panel Data, American Chamber of Commerce Researchers 
Association (ACCRA, now called C2ER) data, National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) data, Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten 
Cohort (ECLS-K) data, Economic Research Service data at the US Department of 
Agriculture, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data, National Food 
Stamp Program Survey (NFSPS) data, and All States Tax Handbook. A detailed 
description of the data and studies follows in Section 2. Thus far, none of the previous 
literature used the Consumer Expenditure Survey data, a key source in this research and 
the only Federal survey to provide information on the complete range of consumers' 
expenditures and incomes. 
In this chapter I use a new research model, a hybrid of the Tobit and quadratic utility 
model, to measure the price elasticity of soda. In my model, households that do and those 
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that do not consume soda are both taken into account. The total utility of households is 
divided into two parts: utility for soda and utility for other goods. The parameters are 
estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, and with the estimated results, both 
the unconditional price elasticity and the conditional price elasticity (conditional on 
households that purchase soda) of soda are estimated. 
My study differs from the previous literature in several respects:  
First, I am using a censored quadratic model, the first model of this type in this field 
to the best of my knowledge. As previously mentioned, studies in this field consistently 
exclude households that do not consume soda, which is likely to cause bias in estimation. 
To avoid this problem, I combine the quadratic utility model, which has become 
increasingly popular in recent years (Di Comite, et al., 2010), with the Tobit model, 
which takes households that do not consume soda into account. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is also the first study that calculates both the conditional and 
unconditional price elasticity for soda, where conditional means conditional on buying 
soda. 
Second, my study avoids the endogeneity problem of using expenditures as one of 
the independent variables as may occur in a Rotterdam or AIDS model, and includes 
household characteristics that are not included in most studies using AIDS or QUAIDS. 
According to LaFrance (1991), expenditures are seldom strictly exogenous, and if 
expenditure is treated as exogenous when it actually is endogenous, the empirical model 
is not necessarily consistent with utility maximization. Edgerton (1993) has also shown 
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that if the expenditures in separable demand models are endogenous, the SUR estimators 
are no longer unbiased. 
Third, this is the first study to use the Consumer Expenditure Survey dataset to study 
the effect of a soda tax on demand. The Consumer Expenditure Survey is the only 
Federal survey to provide information on the complete range of consumers' expenditures 
and incomes, as well as the characteristics of those consumers. Both the consumption 
data and the price data used for this study are from government databases, which are 
noted for their credibility and have a good geographic coverage. Unlike Yen, et al. (2004) 
who only studied low-income households, households with different income levels are all 
included in my study. 
Furthermore, this study is based on Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) level consumption, 
and to my best knowledge, none of the previous literature in this field that studies 
consumption identifies households by their PSU. Consumers in previous studies were 
identified either by nation level (Zheng and Kraiser 2008) or by state level (e.g. Fletcher, 
et al., 2010a), which are generally more aggregate than metropolitan areas. Since PSUs 
are generally smaller than the states (for example, Los Angeles and San Francisco, both 
in California, fall into two different PSUs), and since the price data used in this study also 
divides areas on a less aggregate level than states would (for example, prices for both 
soda and other goods in Los Angeles and San Francisco are divided into different groups), 
this study is better equipped to examine the correlation between price and demand. As for 
studies using the AC Nielsen data, their data tend to represent densely populated areas, 
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and are not available for some rural locations (Ruhm, et al., 2012), such as Maine, which 
is included in my data.  
While most previous literature simply assumes prices to be exogenous (e.g. 
Dharmasena and Capps, 2012), this study confirms the price exogeneity using the 
Hausman’s test. 
The chapter is divided into the following parts: Section 2.2 summarizes the literature 
in this field; Section 2.3 includes the model; Section 2.4 discusses the data resources used 
for this study; Section 2.5 lists the results; and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Review of Literature 
Taxing unhealthy food and beverages is not new. Federal taxation of soft drinks and 
candy dates back to World War I, and state level taxation came out during the Great 
Depression. However, the initial purpose of taxing unhealthy food was to increase 
revenue rather than to address health concerns. As a result of pressure from the food and 
soda industry, many tax assessments on unhealthy foods and beverages were repealed in 
the 1990s (Efrat and Efrat, 2012). However, as attention was drawn to the significant 
increase in obesity a decade ago, policymakers again proposed soda and candy taxes 
(Jacobson and Brownell, 2000). In 2010, 21 states were imposing taxes on soda at a 
higher rate than food taxes (Bridging the Gap Program Soda and Snack Tax). 
In the past decade economists have shown a strong interest in studying taxes imposed 
on soda, since obesity might be controlled by increasing prices of soda (in the form of a 
tax burden). Some studies tried to determine if soda taxes increase soda price. In one of 
the earliest studies in this field, Besley and Rosen (1999) used ACCRA price data and 
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concluded that taxes imposed on soda had the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients associated with overshifting, where the change in soda price exceeds the tax 
change by 29%.  
Given that an increase in soda tax rates significantly increases the price of soda, do 
higher prices lead to lower demand, and thereby, lower obesity rates?14 Cutler, et al. 
(2003) first noticed that people in the OECD countries with more price controls have a 
much lower obesity rate than people in countries without these controls. Their research 
claimed that price reduction is the main cause of increasing obesity, while increases in 
income or the share of women in the labor force (leading to more restaurant meals) do not 
seem to be linked to the increase in obesity. In contrast with these early studies, which 
adopted aggregate data, my study introduces household level consumption. 
Other studies have focused on estimating soda demand. In one of the first studies on 
soda demand, Yen, et al. (2004) built up a Translog demand system, which is similar to 
the AIDS, with the demand share as the dependent variable and prices and total beverage 
expenditure as independent variables. They found that the own price effect is negative 
and significant. It is important to mention that their study is the only study in this field to 
my knowledge that censored the dependent variables and used a maximum likelihood 
estimation to estimate the demand system. Their study, however, has some limitations. 
They include prices and total beverage expenditures as explanatory variables without 
testing for endogeneity. They neither discussed soda taxes nor mentioned the word “tax.”                                                         
14Soda or sugar-sweetened soft drinks have long been considered a major cause of obesity, since they 
contribute 7.1% of total energy intake and are the largest single food source of calories in the last decade 
(Block 2004). And overwhelming literature has shown that more sugar-sweetened beverages leads to higher 
obesity, e.g., Ludwig et al (2001), Mrdjenovic and Levitsky (2003), Schulze, et al. (2004), Apovian (2004), 
James, et al. (2004), Bray, et al. (2004), Belpoggi, et al. (2006). 
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The data they used was from the National Food Stamp Program Survey (NFSPS), which 
is targeted only to low-income households, and therefore their study provides us no 
information about high-income consumers.  
Many researchers used the AIDS or QUAIDS model to study soda demand. Smith, et 
al. (2010) and Lin, et al. (2011) found that a tax-induced 20 percent price increase on 
caloric sweetened beverages could bring an average reduction of 34-47 calories per day 
over a year for adults, as well as an average reduction of 40-51 calories per day for 
children. The authors utilized two datasets: actual consumer grocery purchases of 
beverages from 1998-2007 Nielsen Homescan panels, and individual daily beverage 
intake data with corresponding measured height and weight from the 2003-06 National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). An AIDS model was specified to 
estimate how beverage-purchasing decisions would change as a result of a price increase 
for caloric sweetened beverages. Like Yen, et al. (2004), they used beverage expenditure 
as one of the independent variables without testing its endogeneity. Zheng and Kraiser 
(2008) avoided this problem by doing a Wald test on the endogeneity of prices, though 
they used data at a more aggregate geographic level. Zhen, et al. (2011) used an AIDS 
model and found that a half-cent per ounce tax on sugar-sweetened beverages will result 
in a moderate reduction in consumption of these beverages. Dharmasena and Capps 
(2012) applied a QUAIDS model and found that there was a 1.54-2.55 pound annual 
reduction in body weight due to a 20% tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Both these 
studies predicted expenditure using income and price index.  
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Some researchers studying soda demand estimated price elasticity on soda, as I have 
in this study. The price elasticities they found vary dramatically from -0.15 (Zheng and 
Kraiser, 2008) to -1.97 (Dharmanesa, 2010). Most fall between -0.7 and -1.3 (e.g., 
Brownell, et al., 2009, Andreyava, et al., 2010, Lin, et al., 2011). These results do not 
provide conclusive evidence that consumption responds to price. 
Though studies in this field abound, very few of them have used state level soda 
taxes. One that does is by Fletcher, et al. (2010a), who used a two-way fixed effects OLS 
framework to evaluate the impact of changes in state soda taxes on BMI, obesity, and 
being overweight. To examine the potential effect of soft drink taxes on population 
weight, they used data from the 1990 through 2006 waves of the BRFSS, which was 
conducted annually by state and the US territory health departments and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to provide up-to-date information on health risks for use 
by local health officials and health researchers. They derived the tax data from The Book 
of the States and LexisNexis Academic database and All States Tax Handbook, published 
by the Research Institute of America (RIA 2001). Their results suggested that soda taxes 
influence BMI, but that impact is small in magnitude. They found an increase of 1% 
point in the state soda tax rate leads to a 0.003 decrease in BMI. Their results also suggest 
that taxes have a greater impact on BMI and obesity for low-income adults and Hispanics.  
Instead of studying all household members, some research has focused simply on the 
effect of soda taxes on children. Sturm, et al. (2010) used data on state level sales taxes 
for soda and individual-level data on children to examine whether small taxes are likely 
to alter consumption and weight gain, and whether larger tax increases would be 
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desirable. The researchers found that existing taxes on soda, which are typically not much 
higher than 4 percent in grocery stores, do not largely affect overall levels of soda 
consumption or obesity rates. However, children who were African Americans, already 
overweight, or from poor families, were more sensitive to soda taxes, especially when 
soda was available at school. The researchers combined individual-level national data 
from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K) with state-
level grocery store soda tax data. They examined total consumption of sugar-sweetened 
beverages in the past week, children’s BMI, and consumption of such beverages at school. 
Their study, however, included sports drinks and juices in its definition of soda. It is well 
known, however, that juices are considered to be a necessity for children’s health by 
some parents. Clearly, juices should be separated from soft drinks, such as cola. Unlike 
my study, the research by Sturm and colleagues used only nonnegative variables as 
dependent variables, rather than considering consumers that do not purchase. Similarly, 
Fletcher, et al. (2010b) also found that there is no evidence that taxes on soft drinks are 
effective at reducing children’s weight.  
Rather than study the effectiveness of fat taxes on weight loss, some researchers 
examined the fat taxes from a consumer welfare aspect. Lusk and Schroeter (2012) used a 
two-good (high- and low-calorie food) model and constructed an indirect utility function, 
which included prices of these two goods, exercises, income, and a weight function. By 
comparing the ratio of expenditures on the taxed good to the weight effect of tax against 
one’s willingness to pay for weight reduction, they determined that people would have to 
pay about $1500 to reduce one pound weight for a soda tax to be welfare enhancing. 
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Therefore, they concluded that a soda tax is unlikely to increase consumer welfare. A 
similar framework was adopted by Schroeter, et al. (2008), who used ACCRA and 
BRFSS data to study the conditions under which price and income changes are most 
likely to change body weight. They concluded that a tax on fast food could lead to an 
increase in body weight.  
After examining the previous literature, since there is a great variety in the estimates 
of the demand elasticity, it is clear that another estimate should be conducted, with a 
better population overage, finer geographic level prices, the ability to overcome the 
limitations of endogeneity problems in the AIDS or QUAIDS models, and research to 
verify both the conditional and unconditional price elasticity. Thus my study, which takes 
into account enhanced knowledge and a different point of view, will benefit the literature 
and policymakers. 
2.3 Model 
The model used in this study is a censored quadratic model. Consumer units’ (CU 
henceforth) utility is assumed to be quadratic. The quadratic utility model recently has 
become increasingly popular (Di Comite 2011). Here I separate the utility into two goods: 
soda and all the other goods a CU consumes. The utility for CUi is assumed to be  
Ui=αU1i + βU2i                           (2.1) 
where U1i  denotes the utility for soda consumption in CUi, U2i  denotes the utility for 
other goods’ consumption in CUi. α and β are the coefficients assigned to each of them 
respectively. We assume U1i and U2i take the form:  
U1i=q1i − a1q1i2     (a1 ≥ 0)         (2.2) 
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U2i=q2 − a2q2i2     (a2 ≥ 0)                               (2.3) 
where q1i and q2i are the quantities CUi consumed for soda and other goods, respectively. 
Therefore Equation (2.1) can be rewritten as  Ui=α(q1i − a1q1i2 ) + β(q2i − a2q2i2 )                (2.4). 
It is subject to budget constraint p1jq1𝑖𝑖+p2jq2𝑖𝑖 = I𝑖𝑖 , where p1j and p2j are prices for 
soda and other goods respectively, in area j where CUi lives, and I𝑖𝑖  is CUi’s income. 
Maximizing equation (2.4) under the budget constraint indicates the following 
demand for soda: 
q1i = −βp1j p2j +αp2j2 +2a2βIi p1j2a2βp1j2 +2αa1p2j2                            (2.5). 
By dividing p2j2 in both the numerator and denominator, the demand equation we 
are estimating takes the following form: 
q1i = −β(p 1jp 2j )+α+2a2βIi p 1jp 2j 22a2β(p 1jp 2j)2+2αa1  + εi                              (2.6)     
 where εi is the error term,ε𝑖𝑖     ~     N(0,𝜎𝜎2). 
In a Tobit model (Amemiya 1974), the observed q1𝑖𝑖  relates to latent q1i such that  
       q1i=max{  q1i∗ , 0}                                                  (2.7). 
The demand function (2.6) is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation, 
and the log likelihood function takes the form 
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where ∅(. )andΦ(. )are univariate standard normal probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions (Maddala, 1983). Thus, di=1 if  q1i>0, di=0 if q1i=0. 
Since α and β are assumed to be weights assigned to soda utility and other goods 
utility, respectively, and since they enter the demand function (2.5) in a form that can be 
written as a ratio, we constrain one of them to be constant to identify the model. Here I 
constrain β to be 1,000. As for α, in the first step of my analysis, it is estimated as a 
constant. But in the second step, it is written in a linear function that involves all CUs 
characteristics, i.e. 
α𝑖𝑖=𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)                                (2.9) 
where Xi denotes household characteristics, which includes the sum of square of age for 
each individual in CU i, sum of age for each individual in CU i, total number of people in 
CU i, total number of children in CU i, race characteristics, education level of the referee 
person in CU i, marriage status of the referee person in CU i, a population dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the person lives in area j that has a population of more than 4 
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million, 0 otherwise. The household’s income and square of income, geographic and time 
fixed effects are also included in the function.  
With the estimated value of the parameters, conditional and unconditional price 
elasticity can be calculated following McDonald and Moffitt (1980). For simplicity, 
henceforth I define 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝1𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝2𝑗𝑗  . 
E(q)=
−β𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗+α+2a2β I𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗p 2j2a2β𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 2+2αa1 Φ
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Since ∂Φ(z)
∂z = ∅(z)and ∂∅(z)∂z = −z∅(z) , for simplicity, we denote −βp j +α+2a 2β
Ii p jp 2j2a 2βp j 2+2αa 1
σ
 as z, 
then the unconditional elasticity can be expressed as 
∂E(q)
∂pj pjE(q) = (σ ∂z∂pj Φ(z) + σz∅(z) − σz∅(z)) pjσzΦ(z) + σ∅(z) 
= a2β2pj2−αa1β−2a22β2Ii p j2p 2j +2αa1a2β Iip 2j−2a2αβpj2a22β2pj4+4αa1a2βpj2+2α2a12 Φ(z) pjσzΦ(z)+σ∅(z)           (2.11). 
As for the conditional elasticity, since E(q|q>0)=E(q|ε > −𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎)= σz + σ∅(z)
Φ(z) , we have 
∂E(q|q>0)
∂pj pjE(q|q>0)= σ ∂z∂pj(1 - z∅(z)Φ(z)2- ∅(z)2Φ(z)2) pjσz+σ∅(z)
Φ (z)  
 = 
a2β2pj2−αa1β−2a22β2Ii p j2p 2j +2αa1a2β Iip 2j−2a2αβpj2a22β2pj4+4αa1a2βpj2+2α2a12 (1 - z∅(z)Φ(z)2- ∅(z)2Φ(z)2) pjσz+σ∅(z)Φ (z)                      (2.12). 
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2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Expenditure and Demographic Data 
The consumption and demographic variables come from the database of the “Consumer 
Expenditure Diary Survey” 2006-2010 (CEX henceforth). This survey is derived from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics by the U.S. Census Bureau. The CEX is the only Federal 
survey to provide information on the complete range of consumers' expenditures and 
incomes, along with the characteristics of those consumers. 
Each consumer unit was asked to keep a weekly record of all consumption.15 This 
consumption chart allowed me to obtain the weekly expenditure on carbonated drinks 
(two kinds of goods: cola and other carbonated drinks). The expenditure used for 
carbonated drinks is the sum of expenditure on cola and other carbonated drinks (for 
example, if a CU spent $2.5 on cola and $3.0 on other carbonated drinks, then the CU 
had an expenditure of $5.5 on carbonated drinks). The expenditure includes sales tax 
payments. 
Following Mace (1991), I retained in my sample only those households that reported 
positive income. And following Nelson (1994), I excluded incomplete income reporters 
and used a before-tax income. Since here I used weekly expenditures, income was 
changed to weekly as well by dividing the annual income by 52. 
The other demographic characteristics involved in equation (2.9) also come from the 
CEX data.                                                         
15Some CUs reported consumption over two weeks, others reported consumption over one week. The 
standard errors of the estimated results are therefore adjusted using clustered bootstrapping. Since the 
consumption should be combined with the monthly CPI that I will discuss later, if a CU reports 
consumption in a week that is across two months, for example, if a CU makes consumption on Monday 
(March) and Friday (April), then this CU is deleted from the data. 
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I only chose years 2006-2010 because in these years CEX data are not only identified 
by state, but also by PSU (primary sampling unit). The PSUs reference the largest 
metropolitan area in which the CUs live. Some of the PSUs are single cities, for example, 
Los Angeles. Some are a combination of several cities/counties, for example, Chicago-
Gary-Kenosha. These are combined with the price data as described below. 
2.4.2 Price Data 
The price data for soda (p1) are derived from the US Department of Agriculture 
Economic Research Service (USDA ERS henceforth). Prices are presented in dollars per 
100 grams of food. The price data are quarterly data divided geographically into 26 
“market groups.” These market groups are similar to the PSUs in the CEX data, but not 
exactly the same. Similar to PSUs, some of the market groups consist of a single city, 
such as “Los Angeles,” while some consist of several cities/counties, for example, “South 
Florida” consists of Miami and Tampa. Prices are assigned accordingly to each 
PSU16.The price data provided by USDA ERS do not include tax. For the purpose of this 
study, after-tax price data was developed and used by adjusting by tax rate in each state 
(a description of soda tax data comes in the next section). The quantities of soda 
consumed are computed by expenditure (including sales tax) divided by price (including 
                                                        
16The way to assign prices from each market group to each PSU is as follows. First, the USDA ERS 
provides a codebook that assigns each FIPS to a market group, while FIPS are codes of major counties in 
every state. Then, assigning PSUs that consist of a single city to a market group is quite simple; the cities 
can be identified directly in the market group or assigned to a FIPS and then a corresponding market group. 
For PSUs that consist of more than two counties, especially for those not in the same state (e.g., in Boston-
Brockton-Nashua, Boston and Brockton are in MA while Nashua is in NH), the CUs are then placed by 
state code into the more likely city. For example, if a CU falls in the area “Boston-Brockton-Nashua” and 
its state is NH, then it is more likely to be in or close to Nashua. I then check the FIPS of Nashua and 
identify it in a certain market group. 
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sales tax). Since prices are presented in dollars per 100 grams of food, the results are in 
unit of “100 grams”. 
 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used as price data for other goods (p2). The 
CPI data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the U.S. Census Bureau. Since the 
CPIs reported are only for urban consumers, I only use urban consumers' consumption 
data. Not seasonally adjusted CPIs in “metropolitan area” level are used in this study. 
These metropolitan areas are exactly the same as the areas called PSUs in CEX data, so it 
is easy to combine them with each CU. November 1996 is chosen as the price index's 
base (set to 100)17. 
 For some metropolitan areas, the CPIs are recorded monthly. For some, they are 
recorded every other month. Hence for the months CPIs are not recorded, they are 
estimated as the mean of the closest two months. For example, if the CPI is not recorded 
in February, it is estimated as the mean of CPIs from January and March. In some 
metropolitan areas CPIs are only recorded for every half-year. If that is the case, for 
every month in this half year, they are assigned the same estimated CPI. Therefore, the 
CPI used in this study equals reported  or  estimated  CPI  in  the  given  monthreported  or  estimated  Novermber  1996 CPI × 100.  In the 
following study, I also used two dummies,d1 and d2, and set d1=1, d2=0 if the CPI is 
reported in a given area in a given month (i.e. both the numerator and denominator of the 
above equation is truly “reported”). I set d1=0, d2=1 if the CPI is “estimated” (i.e. if either 
the numerator or denominator of the above equation is “estimated,” or both). Hence, p2                                                         
17I choose November 1996 as the base because this is the latest base time for the area CPIs. In different 
metropolitan areas, CPIs are recorded with different base year, for example, some areas choose 1982-84 as 
their base years, others choose November 1996 as the base. 
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comes in the form of a combination of “real CPI” and “estimated CPI,” that is, p2= d1 × CPI + a3 × d2 × CPI, where 𝑎𝑎3 is a parameter to be estimated. 
2.4.3 State Tax Data 
The state tax rate data are annual data from the “Bridging the Gap Program” of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. These include annual data for 50 states and 
the District of Columbia. For soda there are two kinds of tax data available: the tax for 
soda at grocery stores and soda at vending machines. There are only minor variations 
between the rates. Since the price data are mainly coming from goods sold in grocery 
stores, in this study only the tax rates from grocery stores are used. 
2.5 Results 
[Table 2.1] 
Table 2.1 lists an overall data description. Households are divided into low-income 
households and high-income households using the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 185 percent of poverty guideline. Not surprisingly, low-income 
households consume less soda than high-income households. The p value of t-test of the 
difference in soda consumption in households is 0.009, which indicates that high-income 
households consume significantly more soda than do low-income households. 
 Given that a 12-ounce can of soda weights approximately 340 grams, on average 
a household consumes 8.134 cans per week. The number is 7.643 cans per week for low-
income households, and 8.313 cans per week for high-income households. Among the 
households that purchase soda, they consume 20.627 cans of soda per week on average, 
19.656 cans for low-income households and 20.983 cans for high-income households. 
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This is a sizable amount. At the individual level, an individual consumes around 3.124 
cans of soda per week on average, and 7.038 cans of soda per week among those who 
purchase. A can of cola contains approximately 140 calories, that means on average a 
household takes in around 1,138.760 calories per week from soda, and an individual takes 
in 437.360 calories per week from drinking soda. 
[Table 2.2] 
 The average soda tax rate between 2006 and 2010 is 3.976% across the states 
covered by CEX data. 20 states have a special soda tax rate that is higher than the food 
tax rate in 2006-2007 all across the country,18 and the number increases to 21 states since 
2008. For the households included in our data and years, the average soda tax rate is 
5.893% in the states that have a soda tax rate different from their food tax rate, while the 
average soda tax rate is only 0.417% in the states that equalize soda tax rate and food tax 
rate. From Table 2.2 we can see that consumers living in a state that has a soda tax rate 
higher than the food tax rate always purchase less soda than do consumers living in other 
areas. The p value of household soda consumption difference in these two groups of 
states is 0.034. That is, there is a statistically significant difference between the quantities 
of soda consumed by households living in these two groups of states. Similar results can 
be generated if we consider the soda consumption per person by household: the p value 
of a t-test of consumption difference in these two groups of states is 0.007. Therefore, we 
                                                        
18These states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. West Virginia enters the group in 2008. 
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may conclude that people living in states with a higher soda tax than food tax consume 
significantly less soda than those living in other states. 
 Again, given that a 12-ounce can of soda weighs approximately 340 grams, on 
average a household living in states where soda tax rate equals food tax rate consumes 
8.600 cans of soda per week, while a household living in states where the soda tax rate is 
higher than that on food consumes 8.007 cans of soda per week. The difference between 
the two groups is smaller within households that make purchases: 20.856 cans per week 
for households living in a state that adopts the same soda tax rate and food tax rate, and 
20.563 cans per week for households living in states that have the same soda tax and food 
tax rate. 
 As for the consumption of soda per person: in the states utilizing the same soda 
tax as food tax, a person consumes 3.414 cans of soda per week on average, that is, 
around 177.528 cans per year. In the states that adopt a higher soda tax than food tax, a 
person consumes 3.049 cans of soda per week on average, or 158.548 cans of soda per 
year. Statistically, in one year a person living in a state with a comparably lower soda tax 
rate consumes 18.980 more cans of soda than a person living in a state that has a 
comparably higher soda tax rate. A can of cola contains approximately 140 calories. As a 
result, a person living in a state that has a comparably lower soda tax rate takes in 
approximately 2,657 more calories per year. This is more than the 2,000 daily calories 
intake suggested by the US Food and Drug Administration. In other words, ceteris 
paribus, a person living in a state that has a comparably lower tax rate would need to 
starve him-/herself for more than one day per year to maintain the same weight as one 
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living in a state that has higher soda rate. Similar results can be obtained by studying only 
those who purchase—a person living in a state that has the same soda tax as food tax 
consumes approximately 7.336 cans per week, while a person living in a state that has a 
comparably higher soda tax consumes approximately 6.957 cans of soda per week. In 
other words, a person living in a state that does not distinguish soda from other food in 
taxation consumes 0.379 more cans of soda per week, or 19.708 more cans per year. That 
is 2,759 more calories per year. 
 From Table 2.2 we can also see the percentage of households that consume soda 
in the whole sample is larger in states that have the same soda tax rates as food rate. 
[Table 2.3] 
 Some states changed their tax policy on soda between 2006 and 2010. California, 
Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey and West Virginia increased their soda taxes 
during 2006-2010. Table 2.3 lists the consumption of soda in these states before and after 
the tax reform. The average tax rate increased from an average (taking years into account) 
of 5.938% to 6.580%, which does not seem large, but the influence on consumption is 
quite significant. Before the tax increase, households consumed 2,780.5 grams of soda 
per week on average, or around 8.178 cans of soda per week, or 425.256 cans per year. 
After the tax increase, households consume 2,391.8 grams of soda per week on average, 
or around 7.035 cans of soda per week, or 365.820 cans per year. The p value for a t-test 
of the difference between these two groups of observation is 0.004, which indicates that 
the soda consumption is significantly less after the tax increase. At the individual level, 
the average person consumed 3.034 cans of soda per week before the soda tax policy 
115  
 
changes, and around 2.690 cans per week after the tax changes. Thus, a person takes in 
2,497.040 fewer calories a year after the increase in soda tax. Compared with the 
recommended 2,000 calories intake, this is a significant amount. 
 Before I estimate the model, a Hausman's test was given to soda price. The 
instrumental variable for price that I choose is state soda tax rate, which is added into the 
estimation of demand equation (2.6) using the method given in Davidson and MacKinnon 
(2004). The estimated parameter for the instrumental variable is highly insignificant (t=   
-0.000). The result indicates that prices can be treated as the exogenous variables in my 
estimation. 
2.5.1 Baseline Estimation 
The variable p2j in equation (2.8) is changed tod1j × CPIj + a3 × d2j × CPIj, , where d1j=1, 
d2j=0 if in area j in a given month the CPI is reported; and d1j=0, d2j=1 if the CPI is 
“estimated.” 
       As defined above, α is the weight assigned to soda utility. The quadratic terms in 
equation (2.2) and (2.3) are a1and a2, which are expected to be positive. The coefficient 
before the estimated CPI is a3, which should equal 1 if the CPI is correctly estimated. In 
the first stage,  α, a1, a2 , a3 and σ are all estimated as constants using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The results are shown in the following table. 
[Table 2.4] 
From Table 2.4, we can see that the weight on soda is estimated as 0.354, which is 
much smaller than the setted coefficients for “other goods” (β, which is set as 1,000.)That 
is, the weight assigned to soda utility is relatively small in the “basket of goods” 
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households consume.  𝑎𝑎1 and  𝑎𝑎2 are both positive, which indicates that the quadratic 
utilities of soda and other goods are both concave as expected. 𝑎𝑎3is close to 1 as expected, 
since if CPI is correctly estimated, 𝑎𝑎3 should be 1. 
To test the robustness of the results, I also tried to use after-tax income and incomes 
larger than $5,000, which leads to very similar results. 
2.5.2 Allowing𝜶𝜶 to Depend on Demographics 
Next I estimate each 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  as a function of demographic variables as in equation (2.9). The 
estimation results are listed in Table 2.5. 
[Table 2.5] 
 Table 2.5 reports the estimated results of equation (2.9). We can conclude that 
both the sum of age and age square of family members are significantly correlated with 
utility weight distribution, and the peak age when soda is assigned to the largest weight is 
53 years old. That is, at 53 years old, the utility of soda consumption matters the most 
compared with the utility of consuming other goods. The robustness of this result has 
been tested using a Cobb-Douglas utility model, and the peak age found under the Cobb-
Douglas model is very similar to the figure found using this model. When there are more 
children in the family, or when the household lives in an area that has a small population, 
the weight assigned on soda utility is significantly larger. This is consistent with common 
knowledge, that children and seniors like soda more than the middle-aged, and the 
limitation of selection in remote areas may lead to a larger weight assigned on soda utility 
in the “basket of goods.” 
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2.5.3 Elasticities Estimation 
Using the results from Table 2.5, the unconditional elasticity given in equation (2.11) can 
be estimated. 
[Table 2.6] 
 Table 2.6 lists the results of unconditional elasticity, the mean of which is -1.463. 
This falls between the price elasticity for soft drinks estimated by Pittman (2004), which 
is -1.16, and by Dharmanesa (2010), which is -1.97. Given this high elasticity, there is 
reason for us to believe that adding a tax on soda will reduce consumption. The result 
indicates that a 1% increase in soda price could lead to a 1.463% decrease in soda 
consumption.  
 Since the average soda tax rate was 3.976% in 2006-2010, we may conclude that 
by adopting this soda tax, the soda consumption decreases 5.817%. From Table 2.1 we 
know that the average quantity of soda consumed per person is around 1,062.0 grams per 
week, which means without this tax, the average quantity of soda consumed should be 
around 1,127.6 grams per week. Given that the weight of one twelve-ounce can of soda is 
around 340 grams, and contains 140 calories, this means that by adopting the current soda 
tax, a person takes in 27.012 fewer calories per week. Suppose that a person consumes 
soda for 70 years. Under the current soda tax rate, that person will consume 98,924 fewer 
calories over the course of his or her life. Given that 3,500 calories should be burned to 
lose 1 pound (Mayo Clinic, 2012), with the soda tax implemented, a person is expected to 
lose 28.093 pounds in 70 years, which is a large number. In an extreme case, by imposing 
a 68% soda tax, soda consumption may be reduced to almost zero. 
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 Table 2.6 also tells us that the conditional relative price elasticity, -0.425, is much 
smaller than the unconditional elasticity. It falls between the price elasticity for soft 
drinks estimated by Zheng and Kraiser (2008), which is -0.15, and by Brownell, et al 
(2009), which is -0.8 to -1.0. We can conclude that if we consider conditional elasticity, 
meaning if we consider the elasticity only among the consumers who purchase soda, the 
absolute value of price elasticity is smaller than if we consider all consumers. This is not 
surprising, since when soda price changes, some consumers who did not purchase soda 
might decide to purchase, which makes the unconditional price elasticity more elastic. 
 Given that the average soda tax rate was 3.976% in 2006-2010, we may conclude 
that for households that do purchase soda, the implementation of a soda tax decreases 
consumption by 1.690%. Since the households that do consume soda consume about 
2,392.8 grams per person per week on average, we can infer that with this soda tax a 
person consumes 41.133 gram less soda per week, that is 16.937 calories less per week, 
and 880.740 less calories per year. Thus, for a person living in a household that do 
purchase soda, (s)he is expected to lose 17.615 pound of weight all through his/her life 
due to the soda tax if (s)he consumed soda for 70 years. 
 We can also see from Table 2.6 that both the unconditional elasticity and 
conditional elasticity is larger in its absolute value for the low-income households defined 
by using HHS 185 poverty guidelines. The difference between the two groups of 
households is highly significant in both elasticities (p=0.000). The result indicates that 
low-income households are more sensitive to a change in soda tax. With a 3.976% soda 
tax, the soda consumption decreases 6.163% in low-income households, but only 
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decreases 5.690% in high-income households. If our goals are to fight an obesity 
epidemic among the poor and otherwise disadvantaged, our results shows that 
implementing taxes on soda can be useful, since an increase in soda tax will discourage 
the low-income households from buying soft drinks and increase their overall spending 
on other, presumably more desirable goods. 
2.6 Conclusion 
As obesity has become a serious problem in the United States, economists and 
policymakers have shown a strong interest in studying the increasingly popular soda tax. 
In 2010, 21 states were imposing taxes on soda at a higher rate than food taxes. Studies 
abound, but there is no conclusive answer as to whether a tax on soda is as effective as 
expected. In this paper I used a censored quadratic model to estimate the price elasticity 
of soda, which is defined in this study as cola and other carbonated drinks. 
 The data used in this study are the Consumer Expenditure Diary Survey data from 
the BLS, the U.S. Department of Agricultural Economic Research Service data, and data 
from the “Bridging the Gap Program” at UIUC. The Consumer Expenditure Diary 
Survey, which is the only Federal survey to provide information on the complete range of 
consumers' expenditures and incomes, along with the characteristics of those consumers, 
has never been used in studying soda tax before. 
 The data shows that in the states that are adopting a soda tax rate higher than the 
food tax rate, people consume significantly less soda. Six states increased their soda tax 
between 2006 and 2010. The data shows that households living in these states consumed 
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significantly less soda after the increase in soda tax rate. These statistics may indicate that 
the tax on soda reduces consumption. 
 By dividing the utility into two separate parts (utility for soda and utility for other 
goods), I estimated the demographic effects on the weight of the soda utility. The utility 
function for soda consumption is estimated to be concave. The age curve is also concave, 
and the peak age when consumers put the most weight on soda utility is 53. When a 
household has more children or is living in a less populated area, the weight it puts on 
soda utility is significantly higher. 
 The unconditional relative price elasticity for soda is estimated to be -1.463, 
which shows soda consumption to be very elastic. The result indicates that a 1% increase 
in soda price could lead to a 1.463% decrease in soda consumption. Given that the 
average soda tax rate is 3.976%, we may conclude that with this soda tax, the soda 
consumption decreases 5.817%. Given that the average quantity of soda consumed per 
person is around 1,062 grams per week, that means without this tax, the average quantity 
of soda consumed should be around 1,127.6 grams per week, that is, a person takes in 
27.012 fewer calories per week as a result of the soda taxation. Suppose that a person 
consumes soda for 70 years in his/her life, under the current soda tax rate, s/he will 
consume 98,924 fewer calories all his/her life. Given that 3,500 calories should be burned 
to lose 1 pound, with the soda tax implemented, a person is expected to lose 28.093 
pounds in his/her life, which is a large number. Extrapolating this data to an extreme, by 
imposing a 68% soda tax, the soda consumption might be reduced to around zero. 
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 The conditional elasticity is estimated to be -0.425, which is much smaller than 
the unconditional one. Therefore, the soda price changes affect the whole population 
more substantially than they affect the established soda purchasers. 
 The unconditional and conditional elasticities are both significantly higher in their 
absolute values for the low-income households than for the high-income ones. These 
results indicates that an increase in soda tax will discourage soda purchase more 
substantially among the low-income households. If our goals are to fight an obesity 
epidemic among the poor and otherwise disadvantaged, our results shows that 
implementing taxes on soda can be useful, since an increase in soda tax will discourage 
the low-income households from buying soft drinks and increase their overall spending 
on other, presumably more desirable goods. 
 These results have dramatic implications for policymakers. Since the soda price 
elasticities are so elastic, a significant soda tax policy is expected to be effective. The tax 
policies affect the whole population more substantially than they affect the established 
soda purchasers, indicating to policymakers the group of people that the policies targeted. 
This study provides empirical evidence that suggests that soda taxes are one avenue for 
policymakers to consider in counteracting the serious consequences of obesity.
  
 
2 Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Weekly Soda Consumption (100 Grams) 
  Average Quantity 
Consumed  Per 
Household 
(Standard Deviation) 
Average Quantity 
Consumed Per Person 
 
Percentage of Zero 
Consumption 
(%) 
Number of 
Observation
s 
Whole 
Sample 
All Households 27.645 (54.087) 10.620 60.581 19,483 
Low-Income 
Households 
25.987 (54.999) 9.592 61.114         5,295 
High-Income 
Households 
28.264 (53.731) 11.025 60.382      14,188 
Only Those 
who 
Purchase 
All Households 70.132 (66.647) 23.928 0       7,680 
Low-Income 
Households 
66.830 (71.067) 21.245 0      2,059 
High-Income 
Households 
71.342 (64.917) 25.012 0      5,621 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Weekly Soda Consumption in States with Different Soda Tax Rates Levels (100 Grams) 
 Soda Tax Average Quantity 
Consumed  Per 
Household  
(Standard Deviation) 
Average 
Quantity 
Consumed Per 
Person 
 
Percentage of 
Zero consumption 
(%) 
Average Soda 
Tax rate (%) 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Whole 
Sample 
Same as 
Food Tax  
29.241(51.451) 11.609 58.763      0.417 
(0.527) 
4,091 
Higher 
than Food 
Tax 
27.221(54.760) 10.368 61.064 5.893 
(0.754) 
15,392 
Only 
Those 
who 
Purchase 
Same as 
Food Tax 
70.909(58.866) 24.942 0 0.417 
(1.147) 
1,687 
Higher 
than Food 
Tax  
69.914(68.681) 23.653 0 5.893 
(0.754) 
5,993 
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Table 2.3: Weekly Soda Consumption Before and After Tax Increase in the Six States (100 Grams) 
Soda Tax Average 
Quantity 
Consumed  Per 
Household 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Average 
Quantity 
Consumed Per 
Person 
 
Percentage 
of Zero 
Consumption 
(%) 
Average Soda Tax 
Rate Through Years 
(%) 
(Standard Deviation) 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Before the Increase 27.805 (56.025) 10.316 62.190       5.938 (0.588) 4,073 
After the Increase 23.918 (52.427) 9.150 65.211 6.580 (0.527) 2,725 
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Table 2.4: Baseline Estimation Results 
Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error) in the First Step 
α 𝑎𝑎1 𝑎𝑎2 𝑎𝑎3 σ Log likelihood 
value 
Number of 
Observations 
0.354** 
(0.063) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
1.010** 
(0.032) 
107.385** 
(2.146) 
-53,579 19,483 
*Significant at 10 percent significance level 
** Significant at 5 percent significance level 
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results in the Second Stage 
 Coefficients Estimated Value (Standard Errors) 
(× 10−3)  α 
(weight 
for 
soda) 
� agek2 -0.039**(0.020) 
� agek  4.100**(1.549) 
Number of 
people 
-6.685(13.165) 
Number of 
children 
22.628*(12.653) 
White 18.447(18.289) 
Black 15.362(13.738) 
Native 
American 
7.351(25.439) 
Native 
Hawaiian 
16.454(23.272) 
Multi-race 25.446(26.121) 
Education -16.565(12.117) 
Marriage 
Status 
-19.549(16.205) 
Population -32.573**(14.408) 
Income -0.005(0.019) 
Income2 -6.846e-07(1.100e-06) 
c1 316.419(95.649) 
𝑎𝑎1 6.995(9.094) 
𝑎𝑎2 2.778*(1.448) 
𝑎𝑎3 1,003.316**(56.650) 
σ 104,413.419**(2,457.050) 
Log likelihood value -53,233.600 
Number of 
Observations 
19,483 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
Note: The coefficients of the time and geographic variables are also estimated, but are not listed in the table. 
The standard errors are obtained using clustered bootstrapping.  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Price Elasticity 
 
Price 
Elasticity 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Median Number of 
Observations  
Unconditional 
Elasticity 
All 
Households 
-1.463 0.512 -4.863 0.489 -1.380 19,482 
Low-
Income 
Households 
-1.550 0.547 -4.863 -0.329 -1.482 5,295 
High-
Income 
Households 
-1.431 0.495 -4.301 0.489 -1.348 14,187 
Conditional 
Elasticity 
All 
Households -0.425 0.083 -0.738 0.372 -0.422 19,482 
Low-
Income 
Households 
-0.438 0.086 -0.738 -0.149 -0.440 5,295 
High-
Income 
Households 
-0.420 0.081 -0.710 0.372 -0.416 14,187 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Does Tax Policy Affect Alcohol Consumption? Estimation from a Three-Good 
Utility Model 
3.1 Introduction 
It is widely believed that alcohol consumption can cause serious health and social 
problems. Researchers have found that alcohol causes 4% of the global burden of 
diseases, which accounts for about as much disability and death as tobacco and 
hypertension (Room et al., 2005). The diseases caused by heavy drinking include anemia, 
cancer, cardiovascular disease, Cirrhosis, Dementia, and many more. Alcohol 
consumption during pregnancy can obstruct embryos’ ability to access oxygen and 
nourishment for normal development (Zhang, 2010). Moreover, almost half of all traffic 
fatalities are correlated with alcohol (Brewer et al., 1994). 21-77% of fatal falls, 21-47% 
of drowning deaths, and 21-61% of fatally injured burn victims are also related to alcohol 
(Hingson and Howland, 1993). Alcohol consumption positively relates to unemployment 
(Janlert and Hammarström, 1992) and suicide rates, and 38% of suicide attempters have 
consumed alcohol within 3 hours of the attempt (Powell et al., 2001).  
 Among all types of alcohol beverages, beer and wine are the most important 
sources of alcohol. Beer constitutes about 55% of the ethanol consumed (NIAAA, 2010. 
Ruhm et al., 2012), and beer drinkers have more alcohol-related problems than others 
(Son and Topyan, 2011). Researchers have found out that it is more likely for beer 
drinkers to drink and drive, to be arrested for drunk-drinking, and to be involved in 
alcohol-related accidents (Heien and Pompelli, 1989; Smart, 1996; Son and Topyan, 
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2011). The sale of beer and the assault rate are also significantly related (Norström, 1998). 
As for wine, even though it is widely known that a moderate drink may be good for one's 
health, it was also found that heavy drinkers of wine have a higher prevalence of 
suboptimal health than non-drinkers (Grønbaek, et al., 1999).  
Given the significant relationship between alcohol consumption and health or social 
problems, the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that governments implement 
alcohol taxation to regulate alcohol consumption (Yoon and Lam, 2012). However, there 
is no conclusive answer if these taxes are as effective as expected. Even though a 
majority of researchers have shown that alcohol tax has a sizable negative effect on motor 
vehicle motor fatalities (Saffer and Grossman ,1987; Ruhm 1996; Chaloupka et al., 2002; 
Son and Topyan, 2011; Adams et al., 2012), suicide rates(Parker and Cartmill, 1998), 
alcohol related diseases mortality (Delcher, et al., 2012), and crime (Cook and Moore, 
1994), others argued that alcohol taxes do not necessarily result in lower traffic fatalities 
(Dee, 1999; Mast et al., 1999; Young and Likens, 2000). Some researcher even addressed 
that alcohol taxes may increase the perceived value of the product and hence persuade 
consumers to prefer the purchase of more expensive alcohol (Panzone, 2012).   
In this chapter I use a three good utility model which is a hybrid of the Tobit and 
quadratic model to examine if beer and wine taxes affects consumption. My study differs 
from the previous literature in several aspects. 
First, previous studies were more focused on the relation between alcohol 
consumption and the harmful results brought by alcohol consumption, such as mortality 
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rates or infant health, to demonstrate that alcohol taxes are effective.19 Rather than study 
alcohol demand and calculate price elasticity, a majority of previous studies on alcohol 
taxes used mortality rates as the dependent variable and alcohol taxes and other state 
level demographic variables as the independent variables and ran a regression (e.g. Son 
and Topyan, 2011; Adams, et al., 2011; Delcher et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2012).  
As for the literature that did study consumption and demand, a majority of literature 
did not use micro data such as in household level. For example, the literature that studied 
beer price elasticities mostly used aggregate data (according to Ruhm 2012, 40 of 47 
studies of beer consumption used aggregate data), which yield larger elasticities than 
analyses using individual data (Ruhm et al. 2012) and are sensitive to the choice of 
functional form in the demand model specification (Wagenaar et al., 2009).  
As for the limited literature using individual data, to my best knowledge none of 
them used the Consumer Expenditure Survey,20 which is important because it is the only 
Federal survey to provide information on the complete range of consumers' expenditures 
and incomes, as well as the characteristics of those consumers. Additionally, none of the 
previous studies divided households into high-income households and low-income 
households. Dividing households into groups according to their income level tend to be                                                         19Literature that examine the relation between alcohol taxes and the its effect on health or social problems 
includes Cook and Tauchen (1982);Saffer and Grossman (1987); Saffer and Chaloupka (1989);Evans et al., 
(1991);Hingsonans Howland (1993);Kenkel, (1993);Chaloupka et al. (1993); Mullahy and Sindelar(1994); 
Sloan et al. (1994);Ruhm(1996); Ohsfeldt and Morrisey (1997); Pacula (1998); Grossman and Markowitz 
(1999); Markowitzand Grossman (2000); Sen (2003);Zhang (2010);Morrisey and Grabowski (2011); 
Adams et al. (2012); Delcher et al. (2012); Lhachimi et al. (2012). The health and social problems 
examined include auto fatalities, drinking and driving, disease mortality, non-traffic unintended injuries; 
pregnancy; marijuana consumption; child abuse, education, violence and crime. 20The individual data used in previous literature include Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Household 
Food Consumption Survey, National Health Interview Survey, National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  
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useful in economic analysis. By dividing households into high-income and low-income 
groups, studies on soft drink taxes have shown that large differences in price elasticities 
among the two groups exist (e.g. Lin et al., 2011; Zhen et al., 2011). Similar results might 
be found in beer and wine elasticities analysis. 
3.2 Model 
The model used in this study is a censored quadratic model. Households’ utility is 
assumed to be quadratic. Here, I separate the utility to three goods: beer, wine and all the 
other goods a household consumes. Therefore the utility function is assumed to be  
U=α(q1 − 𝑎𝑎1q12)+β(q2 − 𝑎𝑎2𝑞𝑞22) + γ(q3 − 𝑎𝑎3𝑞𝑞32)                 (3.1) 
where q1 is the quantity of beer consumed per household per week, q2 is the quantity of 
wine consumed per household per week, q3 is the quantity of other goods consumed. The 
weights assigned to each utility are α,β and γ. To identify the model, here I set γ to be 
1,000, and 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2 and 𝑎𝑎3 are constants, which are estimated in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
 The utility function is subject to the budget constraint p1q1 + p2q2 + p3q3 = I, 
where I represents the household income.  
 By maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, we can derive 
the following two equations of q1 and q2 in forms of each other.                𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 = − 𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 + −p1𝑝𝑝3𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32+2𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+2𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖    if RHS>0 
                  =0                                         if RHS≤0                                    (3.2).               𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 = a1αp2a2βp1 q1i + p1β−αp22a2βp1 + 𝑢𝑢2𝑖𝑖    if RHS>0 
                  = 0                                           if RHS≤0 
Assuming 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖  and 𝑢𝑢2𝑖𝑖  are bivariate normal: 
  (𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢2𝑖𝑖)~𝑁𝑁(�00� , � 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 �)                                                   (3.3). 
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If we introduce dummy variables 𝑑𝑑1,𝑑𝑑2and 𝑑𝑑3, for each observation i, the beer and 
wine consumption falls into one of the following categories: 
S1={𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 > 0, 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 > 0}, where 𝑑𝑑1 = 1,𝑑𝑑2 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑3 = 0. 
S2={𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 > 0, 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 = 0}, where 𝑑𝑑1 = 0,𝑑𝑑2 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑3 = 0 
S3={𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 > 0}, where 𝑑𝑑1 = 0,𝑑𝑑2 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑3 = 1 
and S4={𝑖𝑖|𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 = 0} where 𝑑𝑑1 = 0,𝑑𝑑2 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑3 = 0. 
  Following Amemiya (1974), Let f be the density of bivariate normal in (3.3), the 
log likelihood function can be written as 
L=∑(𝑑𝑑1log⁡( 1 + α𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝22𝑎𝑎2𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾β+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎2𝑝𝑝32β)f(𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 − −p1𝑝𝑝3𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32+2𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+2𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32 , 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 −
a1αp2a2βp1 q1i − p1β−αp22a2βp1 ) + 𝑑𝑑2log⁡(∫ 𝑓𝑓(− a 1αp 2a 2βp 1q1i−p 1β−αp 22a 2βp 1−∞ 𝑞𝑞1𝑖𝑖 −
−p1𝑝𝑝3𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32+2𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+2𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32 ,𝑢𝑢2)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢2) + 𝑑𝑑3log⁡(∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖−−p 1𝑝𝑝3𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32+2𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+2𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32−∞ 𝑢𝑢1, 𝑞𝑞2𝑖𝑖 −
p1β−αp22a2βp1 )𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢1) + (1 − 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑑2 − 𝑑𝑑3)∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢1, −−p 1𝑝𝑝3𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32+2𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝12𝑝𝑝12𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾+2𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝32−∞−p 1β−αp 22a 2βp 1−∞ 𝑢𝑢2)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢1𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢2)                       
(3.4). 
 
3.2.1. Estimation of Unconditional and Conditional Elasticities for Beer 
Starting from the structural form (3.2), we can derive the reduced form for q1as follows: 
q1=2βa2γa3�p 1p 3�� Ip 3�−βγ a3�p 1p 3��p 2p 3�+αγ a3�p 2p 3�2−γβ a2�p 1p 3�+αβ a22βa2γa3(p 1p 3)2+2αa1γa3(p 2p 3)2+2αa1βa2 + ε1   (3.5) 
whereε1 = 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2 𝑢𝑢1 − 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2 𝑢𝑢2 
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Since 𝑢𝑢1 and 𝑢𝑢2 follows the distribution in (3.3), we have 
ε1~N(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀12 ) 
where 
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀12 = ( 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾
𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2)2𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2 + ( 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3��𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2)2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 −
2 (𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 )2�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�3�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎22𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾2𝛾𝛾�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3��𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�(𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2)2 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦                            (3.6). 
For simplicity, we denote 2βa2γ a 3�p 1p 3�� Ip 3�−βγ a 3�p 1p 3��p 2p 3�+αγ a 3�p 2p 3�2−γβ a 2�p 1p 3�+αβ a 22βa 2γa3(p 1p 3)2+2αa1γa3(p 2p 3)2+2αa 1βa 2
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1  as 𝜎𝜎1. 
Following McDonald and Moffitt (1980), in a single Tobit model,  
E(q1)=𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1𝜎𝜎1Φ(𝜎𝜎1) + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1∅(𝜎𝜎1)                                                   (3.7) 
where Φ and ∅ are cdf and pdf of standard normal, respectively. 
Since 𝜕𝜕Φ(𝜎𝜎)
𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎
= ∅(𝜎𝜎)and 𝜕𝜕∅(𝜎𝜎)
𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎
= −𝜎𝜎∅(𝜎𝜎), the unconditional price elasticity comes in the 
form: 
∂E(q1)
∂�
p 1p 3�
�
p 1p 3�E(q1) = �∂(𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1)∂�p 1p 3� Φ(𝜎𝜎1)� �p 1p 3�𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1𝜎𝜎1Φ(𝜎𝜎1)+𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1∅(𝜎𝜎1)                      (3.8).  
  For the conditional price elasticity of beer: 
E(𝑞𝑞1|𝑞𝑞1 > 0) 
= E(𝑞𝑞1|𝜀𝜀1 > −𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1) 
=𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1𝜎𝜎1 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1 ∅(𝜎𝜎1)Φ(𝜎𝜎1) 
The conditional price elasticity is estimated as 
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∂E(q1|q1>0)
∂�
p 1p 3�
�
p 1p 3�E(q1|q1>0)=(∂(𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1)∂�p 1p 3� + 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1∂�p 1p 3� ∅(𝜎𝜎1)Φ(𝜎𝜎1) +
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎1∂�p 1p 3� �− z1∅(z1)Φ(𝜎𝜎1) − ∅(z1)2Φ(z1)2�) p 1p 3𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1z1+𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀1∅(z1)Φ (z1)                                                      (3.9). 
Using the estimated results of the parameters from (3.4), we can estimate the 
conditional and unconditional price elasticities (3.8) and (3.9).  
 
3.2.2. Estimation of Unconditional and Conditional Elasticities for Wine 
From (3.2) we can also derive the reduced form for q2as follows: 
𝑞𝑞2 =   −𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3� + 2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3� � 𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝3� + 𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎1𝛾𝛾 − 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2 + 2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 + 2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2 + ε2 
         =   −𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�� 𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2+𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎1𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 1𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2  +    
𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎12𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)
𝑎𝑎22𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)3+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎22𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾2�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�+𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2 𝑢𝑢1 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾 𝑢𝑢2   
                                                                                                                            (3.10). 
ε2~N(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀22 ) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀22 =
�
𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎12𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)
𝑎𝑎22𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)3+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎22𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾2�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�+𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2�
2
𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥
2 +
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�
𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾
𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾�
2
𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦
2 +
2𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦( 𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎12𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)
𝑎𝑎22𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾2𝛾𝛾(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)3+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎22𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾2�𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�+𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2)( 𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾+𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼�𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾 
(3.11) 
To calculate the unconditional and conditional price elasticity of wine, I denote 
−𝑎𝑎1𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�+2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎3𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3�� 𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝3�+𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 �𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3�2+𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎1𝛾𝛾−𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2𝑎𝑎2𝑎𝑎3𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝3)2+2𝑎𝑎1𝑎𝑎2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 +2𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎 1𝑎𝑎3(𝑝𝑝2𝑝𝑝3)2
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2  as 𝜎𝜎2 . Therefore, E(q2) can be written 
as E(q2)=𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎2Φ(𝜎𝜎2) + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2∅(𝜎𝜎2). 
 The unconditional price elasticity can be written as: 
∂E(q)
∂�
p 2p 3�
�
p 2p 3�E(q) = �∂(𝜎𝜎2𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)∂�p 2p 3� Φ(𝜎𝜎2)� �p 2p 3�𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎2Φ(𝜎𝜎2)+𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2∅(𝜎𝜎2)                                                (3.12) 
 
  For the conditional price elasticity: 
E(𝑞𝑞2|𝑞𝑞2 > 0) 
= E(𝑞𝑞2|𝜀𝜀2 > −𝜎𝜎2𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2) 
=𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎2 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 ∅(𝜎𝜎2)Φ(𝜎𝜎2) 
The conditional price elasticity is estimated as 
∂E(q2|q2>0)
∂�
p 2p 3�
�
p 2p 3�E(q2|q2>0)=(∂(𝜎𝜎2𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2)∂�p 2p 3� + 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2∂�p 2p 3� ∅(𝜎𝜎2)Φ(𝜎𝜎2) +
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 𝜕𝜕𝜎𝜎2∂�p 2p 3� �− z2∅(z2)Φ(𝜎𝜎2) − ∅(z2)2Φ(z2)2�) p 2p 3𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2z2+𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2∅(z2)Φ (z2)                                 (3.13) 
136  
 
 
3.3 Data 
The consumption data used in this study are from the Consumer Expenditure Diary 
Survey, 2006-2011, which are derived by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. It includes 
weekly consumption of households identified by primary sampling units (PSU). 
Demographic variables are recorded for each household, such as number of people, their 
ages, income level, etc.  
The price data for beer and wine are from Council for Community and Economic 
Research (C2ER, formerly known as ACCRA). C2ER is a nonprofit professional 
organization comprising research staff of chambers of commerce, economic development 
organizations and agencies, and related organizations throughout the United States and 
Canada. The data was collected by chambers of commerce or economic development 
agencies and in a handful of cases, universities or colleges. They were required to visit a 
specific number of stores depending on the size of the community. The prices published 
are averages of those prices submitted.  
Although Ruhm, et al. (2012) argued that the elasticity estimated by ACCRA data is 
not that stable, it is still so far the most widely used data on beer and wine price, and it 
still dominates the Nielsen data, since it includes many more cities than do the Nielsen 
data. The Nielsen data are not available for some rural locations, including the entire state 
of Maine, which ACCRA involves (Ruhm et al., 2012). 
The prices are given in city level, which is less aggregate than the PSU. To assign the 
price data to each PSU, if a PSU contains a single city, such as Atlanta, then I simply use 
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the price data in that city. If a PSU contains multiple cities, such as San Francisco-San 
Jose-Oakland, then I use the mean price of the three cities. If a PSU does not indicate to a 
specific city, but contains an area, such as “New Jersey suburbs,” then I pick up a city in 
New Jersey suburbs (Bergen), and use its price; State-PSU combinations are also taken 
into account when assigning prices. For example, if a CU is in state “Maine,” and their 
PSU is “Boston – Brockton – Nashua, MA – NH – ME – CT,” then I pick up a city 
that falls in this area in state Maine, that is Portland, and use its price. Following the 
method of estimating CPI in Section 2.4.2, which includes two dummies, d1 and d2, to 
classify whether the CPI is reported or estimated. I also set two dummies, d3 and d4 here 
to classify whether the beer/wine prices are reported (e.g. prices in Atlanta, then d3=1, 
d4=0) or estimated (e.g. prices in New Jersey suburbs, then d3=0, d4=1). The beer price 
p1isfinally written in the form as d3 × beerprice + a5 × d4 × beerprice, and the wine 
price p2 is written in the form as d3 × wineprice + a6 × d4 × wineprice, where 𝑎𝑎5 and 
𝑎𝑎6 are parameters to be estimated. 
The original beer prices provided by the C2ER were in the form as the price for a 
six-pack of 12-ounce containers. And the wine prices were in the form as 1.5-liter bottle 
table wine. All the prices used in this study are changed to price per gallon.  
The price for all goods (p3) are estimated by using the CPI data, as described in 
Section 2.4.2.  
The beer and wine tax data are from the Tax Foundation. They are state level annual 
tax per gallon. The final prices for beer (p1) and wine (p2) are per gallon prices adjusted 
by taxes.  
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3.4 Results 
[Figure 3.1] 
Over the past decade, the tax rate on beer and wine increased rapidly. Figure 3.1 
shows the average tax rate of beer and wine over 23 states from 2006 to 2011.21 The 
average tax for beer was $0.209/gallon in 2006, and $0.290/gallon in 2011, making a 
38.8% increase. The average tax for wine was $0.667/gallon in 2006, and $0.879/gallon, 
making a 31.8% increase.  
[Table 3.1] 
According to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, moderate alcohol consumption 
is defined as having up to one drink per day for women and up to two drinks per day for 
men. The definition of a “standard drink” is a bottle of 12 ounces of beer or a glass of 5 
ounces of wine, both of which contains 0.6 fluid ounces pure alcohol. 
Table 3.1 shows the weekly consumption of beer and wine, among all households 
and only households that purchase beer and/or wine. The average weekly consumption of 
beer is 0.297 gallons per household, which is about 38.016 ounces or about 3 bottles of 
regular 12-ounces beer. Since normally a bottle of beer contains about 0.6 fluid ounces 
pure alcohol, on average a household takes in about 1.8 ounces of alcohol per week from 
beer. The average weekly consumption of beer is 0.113 gallons per person, which is 
about 14.46 ounces, or a little more than one regular bottle of beer, which contains about 
0.6 fluid ounces pure alcohol. As for the households that do purchase beer, a household 
consumes 1.493 gallons (191.104 ounces), or about 16 12-ounces bottles of beer per                                                         
21These states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
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week. Additionally, an average person who lives in a household that purchases beer 
consumes 0.568 gallon (72.704 ounces), or about 6 12-ounce bottles of beer per week. 
Since “heavy drinking” is typically defined as 15 drinks for men or 8 drinks for women 
per week, we can see that on average people filling out the CEX surveys are not heavy 
beer drinkers.  
The average weekly consumption of wine is 0.246 gallons, or 31.488 ounces per 
household. That is about 6 regular glasses of table wine, which contains about 3.6 ounces 
pure alcohol. At the individual level, an average person consumes 0.094 gallons, or 
12.032 ounces wine per week. That is about 2 regular glasses of table wine, which 
contains about 1.2 fluid ounces of pure alcohol. As for the households that do purchase 
wine, the average weekly consumption of wine is 1.493 gallons (or 191.104 ounces) per 
household, and 0.568 gallons (72.704 ounces) per person. The households that do 
purchase wine consume around 38 glasses of table wine per week, so each person 
consumes around 15 glasses of table wine. We can see from these statistics that the 
households that do purchase wine consume much more wine than households on average. 
Since “heavy drinking” is typically defined as 15 drinks for men or 8 drinks for women 
per week, we can conclude that people in general are not heavy drinkers of wine, but 
people living in households that do purchase wine are likely to be heavy drinkers.  
From Table 3.1 we can also conclude that, taking all households into consideration, 
high-income households always consume more beer and wine compared with low-
income households. The p-value of the t-test of beer and wine consumption between 
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these two groups are both 0.000, which indicates that the consumption of beer and wine 
is significantly higher in high income groups.  
The same conclusions can be made by studying only households that do purchase. 
The p-value of the t-test of beer and wine consumption between the high- and low-
income groups are 0.000 and 0.002, respectively.  
3.4.1 Baseline Estimation 
[Table 3.2] 
To obtain the initial values, in the first step of the Baseline Estimation, equation (3.5) 
is estimated by assuming all the parameters are constants. The results are shown in Table 
3.2. As stated in Section 3.2, γ is set to be 1,000, while α and β are the coefficients in 
front of utilities for beer and wine, respectively. The coefficient in front of the quadratic 
terms in the three utilities are 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, and 𝑎𝑎3, such as q1 − 𝑎𝑎1q12. They are positive as 
expected. Also, 𝑎𝑎4, 𝑎𝑎5 and  𝑎𝑎6  are the coefficients in front of the dummy indicating 
estimated price for all goods (p3), price for beer (p1) and price for wine (p2), respectively. 
If these prices are correctly estimated, 𝑎𝑎4,  𝑎𝑎5 and 𝑎𝑎6 should be 1. From the results we can 
see that 𝑎𝑎5 and 𝑎𝑎6 are very close to 1.  
The standard errors of these coefficients are estimated using clustered (on 
households) bootstrapping. From the results we can see that none of these coefficients are 
significant. 
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3.4.2 Allowing 𝜶𝜶 and 𝜷𝜷 to Depend on Demographics 
In the second step of the baseline estimation, α and β are assumed to be functions of sets 
of demographic variables, which include sum of age square, sum of age, number of 
people in the household, number of children in the household, race, education, marriage 
status, population size, household income and household income square. Geographic and 
time fixed effects are also included in the functions (but their coefficients and standard 
errors are not listed in Table 3.3). For a more detailed discussions of these variables, refer 
to Section 2.4.  
The values for parameters in Table 3.3 are estimated in several steps. First, using the 
estimated parameters in Table 3.2 as the initial values, set alpha as a constant and beta as 
a function of demographic variables as discussed in the above paragraph, and estimate the 
parameters in beta. Then, set beta as a constant and alpha as a function of demographic 
variables, and estimate the parameters in alpha. Next, using the estimated results as initial 
values, set both alpha and beta as functions of demographic variables, and estimated the 
parameters, the results of which are included in Table 3.3. The standard errors are 
estimated using clustered bootstrapping. 
[Table 3.3] 
From Table 3.3, we can see that most of the variables are significant at a 5% 
significance level. The correlation variable, rho, is estimated to be negative. Since this 
correlation between error terms is positively correlated with the correlation between beer 
and wine consumption, this can be explained by the fact that since beer and wine are 
substitutes, the correlation of their consumption is likely to be negative.  
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3.4.3 Price Elasticities Estimation 
Using the results from Table 3.3, the estimated price elasticity for beer and wine are 
listed in Table 3.4. 
[Table 3.4] 
From Table 3.4, we can conclude that the absolute values of both the conditional and 
unconditional price elasticities for beer are very small, especially for the high-income 
households. For the high-income households, the mean unconditional price elasticity and 
the mean conditional price elasticity are both minimal (absolute values smaller than 10e-
6). The absolute value of price elasticities for low-income households are larger, but is 
still smaller than 0.001. Since beer contains around 5% alcohol, if the beer price goes up 
by 1%, the beer consumption will fall by 0.00057‰, alcohol intake will decline by 
0.000029‰, which is a very small number. Given the small price elasticity for beer, we 
may conclude that the consumption of beer is very inelastic. Therefore, the tax imposed 
on beer is unlikely to reduce alcohol intake through reducing beer consumption.  
Compared with beer, the conditional and unconditional price elasticities for wine are 
much larger. The average unconditional elasticity for wine is -2.855, which means with a 
1% increase in wine price, the consumption for wine will fall by 2.855%. From the 
previous discussion, we noted that the tax imposed on wine is $0.879/gallon on average 
in 2011. Since the average wine price (before tax) in the 23 states is $19.587/gallon, with 
a $0.879 tax, the wine price increases by 4.488%. That is, given the unconditional price 
elasticity of wine as -2.855, the consumption of wine in all households falls by 12.813% 
with the wine tax imposed. Suppose that a person drinks one glass of wine everyday, then 
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with this wine tax imposed, s/he stops drinking one day in every eight days. Given the 
average wine consumption as 0.094 gallons per week per person, without the wine tax, 
the average weekly wine consumption per person should be 0.107 gallons per week. In 
other words, the wine tax reduced wine consumption by 0.013 gallons (1.644 ounces) per 
week per person. The ordinary definition of a “standard drink” is 5 ounces (one glass) of 
table wine, which contains about 0.6 fluid ounces of pure alcohol. Therefore, if the wine 
tax were not imposed, an average person would drink 17 more “standard drinks” in a year.  
From Table 3.4 we can also see that for both beer and wine, price elasticity (absolute 
value) for high-income households are smaller than low-income households. Also, the 
unconditional price elasticity (absolute value) is larger than the conditional price 
elasticity. This is consistent with the results derived in Chapter 2. As explained in 
Chapter 2, these results are not surprising: the low-income households are generally more 
sensitive to price change, and when beer or wine price changes, some consumers who did 
not purchase beer or wine might decide to purchase, which makes the unconditional price 
elasticity even more elastic. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Alcohol has brought serious health problems and injuries sustained in automobile 
accidents. Therefore the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that governments 
implement alcohol taxation to regulate alcohol abuse. In the past decade the taxes 
imposed on beer and wine have been increasing very rapidly. Economists have also 
shown a strong interest in studying the alcohol taxes, but there is no conclusive answer 
whether a tax on alcohol is as effective as expected. 
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In this study, a three good utility model is used to estimate the price elasticity of 
beer and wine. Households that do and do not consume beer and/or wine are all taken 
into account. The data used in this study are the Consumer Expenditure Diary Survey 
data and C2ER data. It was found that the beer consumption is very inelastic, while the 
price elasticity for wine is high. That is, the influence of beer tax on beer consumption is 
minimal, while with the current wine tax imposed, an average person generally drinks 17 
fewer glasses of wine in a year. 
Both the unconditional and conditional (on households that do purchase) price 
elasticity for beer and wine are estimated. It is found that for both beer and wine the 
unconditional price elasticity is larger than the conditional price elasticity. This result is 
similar to the unconditional and conditional price elasticity of soda estimated in Chapter 
2. 
Households are divided into high- and low-income groups using HHS 185 threshold. 
And the results show that the price elasticities for both beer and wine are smaller in the 
high-income households. In other words, price change affects low-income households 
more substantially. This result is also similar to the result in Chapter 2. 
The results have very important policy implications. Since the price elasticity of 
beer is very small, we may conclude that beer tax does not have a substantial effect on 
beer consumption. Therefore, imposing taxes on beer may not be a good idea to control 
alcohol abuse. However, the price elasticity of wine is quite large. Hence, the wine tax 
might be a good avenue for policymakers to consider in counteracting the serious 
consequences of alcohol abuse. Since the low-income households have larger price 
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elasticity in both beer and wine, the tax policy may be more effective on the low-income 
households. Therefore, if the goal of the U. S. government is to control alcohol related 
health problems or crime rates among low-income households, increasing taxes on wine 
might be a good avenue. 
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Figure 3.1: Average State Tax Rates Change Over Years 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Weekly Consumption of Beer and Wine (Gallon) 
 Income 
Level 
Beer Number of 
Observatio
ns 
Wine Number 
of 
Observa
tions 
Average 
Quantity 
Consume
d Per 
Househol
d  
Average 
Quantity 
Consume
d Per 
Person 
Percentage 
of Zero 
Consumpti
on by 
Households 
(%) 
Average 
Quantity 
Consume
d Per 
Week 
Average 
Quantity 
Consume
d Per 
Person 
Percentage 
of Zero 
Consumpti
on by 
Households 
(%) 
All 
Househ
olds 
All  0.297 
(0.955) 
0.113 80.104 26,855 0.246 
(1.580) 
0.094 85.932 26,855 
Low  0.137 
(0.614) 
0.051 89.360 7,265 0.065 
(0.456) 
0.024 93.532 7,265 
High  0.356 
(1.048) 
0.138 76.672 19,590 0.314 
(1.824) 
0.121 68.639 19,590 
Only 
Those 
Purchas
e 
All  1.493 
(1.674) 
0.568 0 5,343 1.751 0.703 0 3,778 
Low  1.290 
(1.438) 
0.459 0 773 1.190 0.529 0 395 
High  1.527 
(1.709) 
0.588 0 4,570 1.816 0.722 0 3,383 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Estimation 
 α β 𝑎𝑎1 𝑎𝑎2 𝑎𝑎3 𝑎𝑎4 𝑎𝑎5 𝑎𝑎6 σ𝑥𝑥  σ𝑦𝑦  rho 
Estimated 
Value 
(Standard 
Error) 
0.003 
(0.102
) 
0.210 
(7.211
) 
0.574 
(23.075
) 
0.000 
(0.003
) 
0.001 
(0.006
) 
1.343 
(10.255
) 
2.058 
(3.837
) 
1.675 
(12.538
) 
6.571 
(88.512
) 
4.845 
(102.402
) 
0.00
0 
(0.19
5) 
Log 
Likelihood 
 -1.221× 107   
148 
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results in the Second Stage 
 Coefficients Estimated value 
(Standard error) 
(e-03)  α (Weight for Beer) 
 
� agek2 26.631** (4.474) 
� agek  47.897** (16.475) 
Number of People -72.444** 
(7.963) 
Number of Children 3.192** 
(0.779) 
White -19.820** 
(2.593) 
Black 3.364** 
(0.415) 
Native American 21.543** 
(1.910) 
Native Hawaiian -28.659** 
(1.197) 
Multi-race -4.644** 
(0.682) 
Education -19.654** 
(2.266) 
Marriage Status -15.439** 
(1.507) 
Population 6.536 
(8.859) 
Income 14.093** 
(5.438) 
Income2 8.277** 
(1.954) 
c1 -13.400** 
(1.251) 
β (weight for wine) � agek2 0.071** (0.021) 
� agek  0.008** (0.001) 
Number of People -0.004** 
(0.000) 
Number of Children 0.071** 
(0.021) 
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White -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Black -0.025** 
(0.002) 
Native American -0.028** 
(0.001) 
Native Hawaiian -0.048** 
(0.004) 
Multi-race -0.063* 
(0.029) 
Education -0.021** 
(0.004) 
Marriage Status 0.010** 
(0.001) 
Population -0.058** 
(0.020) 
Income 0.007** 
(0.001) 
Income2 0.037** 
(0.006) 
c2 166.438** 
(39.892) 
 𝑎𝑎1 2,372.305** 
(18.002) 
𝑎𝑎2 0.356 
(0.046) 
𝑎𝑎3 0.574** 
(0.172) 
𝑎𝑎4 9,519.818** 
(2,711.474) 
𝑎𝑎5 1,682.162** 
(66.695) 
𝑎𝑎6 1,051.178** 
(49.326) 
σ𝑥𝑥  2,620.548** 
(1,384.882) 
σ𝑦𝑦  22,894.931* 
(8,362.245) 
rho -0.482** 
(0.068) 
Log Likelihood Value  -3,370,140 
Number of Observations  26,855 
** Significant at 5% significance level    * Significant at 10% significance level 
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Table 3.4: Estimated Price Elasticity for Beer and Wine 
 Elastici
ty 
Inco
me 
Level 
Mean 
(Standa
rd 
Deviati
on) 
Minimu
m 
Maxim
um 
Media
n 
Number of 
Observations  
Beer 
(×10−3) 
Uncond
itional 
Elastici
ty 
All  -0.057 
(1.046) 
-70.619 0.000 -0.000 26,855 
Low  -0.209 
(2.004) 
-70.619 -0.000 -0.005 7,265 
High  -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.004 0.000 -0.000 19,590 
Conditi
onal 
Elastici
ty 
All  -0.042 
(0.975) 
-70.619 0.000 -0.000 26,855 
Low  -0.156 
(1.871) 
-70.619 -0.000 -0.002 7,265 
High  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.002 0.000 -0.000 19,590 
Wine 
 
Uncond
itional 
Elastici
All  -2.855 
(5.801) 
-16.720 81.526 -4.037 26,855 
Low  -6.685 -16.720 -1.340 -6.519 7,265 
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ty (1.622) 
High  -1.435 
(6.140) 
-12.003 81.526 -2.797 19,590 
Conditi
onal 
Elastici
ty 
All  -0.052 
(2.124) 
-5.590 30.630 -0.468 26,855 
Low  -1.480 
(0.665) 
-5.590 0.512 -1.393 7,265 
High  0.478 
(2.232) 
-3.374 30.630 -0.017 19,590 
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